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ARTICLE 
TOO MANY TIARAS: CONFLICTING 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE FAMILY-OWNED 
BUSINESS CONTEXT 
Karen E. Boxx* 
ABSTRACT 
Family-owned businesses have been called the backbone of 
the U.S. economy, but passing control of a family business to the 
next generation is so complex that the majority of family 
businesses do not survive the transition. A common scenario that 
leads to problems is where owners want to leave the business to 
their children but only one child is interested in and capable of 
managing the business. A popular solution is to leave the 
interested child an equal share of the business, together with 
management control, and leave the other children interests in 
the business in trust, with the manager child as trustee. This 
raises difficulties for the managertrustee because the fiduciary 
duties of a trustee are much stricter than those of a business 
entity fiduciary. The children whose shares are in trust may also 
be disadvantaged if the managertrustee child is able to use the 
lower business fiduciary standard to reduce the value of the 
trusts interests in the business. The resulting uncertainty and 
litigation increase the likelihood that the business will not 
survive. This Article first reviews the specific duties owed by 
trustees and by fiduciaries of the various business entity formats. It 
then analyzes the theories supporting imposition of fiduciary duty 
and the purposes of fiduciary duty in the various roles in order to 
determine what level of duty is essential to the trusteebusiness 
                                            
 * Associate Professor, University of Washington School of Law. I would like to 
thank Professor Thomas R. Andrews and Todd Maybrown for invaluable assistance in 
writing this article. 
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fiduciary. Next it reviews case law where courts have had to 
identify the applicable fiduciary duty for a dual-role fiduciary. 
Finally, it argues for a new, hybrid duty that allows for the 
flexibility to take on risk as needed in the business context and 
that accommodates the fiduciarys personal interests in the 
business, but still recognizes the vulnerability of the trust 
beneficiary. A clearer level of duty tailored to this unique position 
would protect not only the business owners but all who benefit 
from the continued viability of the family business. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The family situation of Harry Winston, the famed jeweler, 
was similar to many closely held business owners.1 He had two 
                                            
 1. Harry Winston, a child of Ukrainian immigrants, opened Harry Winston, Inc. in 
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sons, one who graduated from Harvard with a degree in 
chemistry, worked in rocket research, and then entered the 
family business at the request of his father, and the other who 
dropped out of college and, according to many accounts, was 
uninterested in business affairs.2 When it came time to pass the 
business down to his sons, Mr. Winston had the same instincts as 
most parents in this situation: he wanted to treat his sons 
equally financially but also wanted his business-oriented son in 
charge of the company. He attempted to achieve this by leaving 
the business equally to the sons, but Ronald, the hardworking 
one, was a trustee, together with two professional trustees, for 
the share of his brother, Bruce.3 Ronald was also left in charge of 
running the business.4 The result of this estate plan was twelve 
years of litigation between the brothers (and corresponding 
litigation against the other trustees lasting even longer).5 
The Winston estate illustrates the dilemma of both children 
in this scenario. The uninvolved child is at the mercy of his 
sibling, who has significant opportunity to exploit the position of 
power while being protected by imprecise and, in some instances, 
lax or nonexistent fiduciary standards of conduct. The child in 
charge of the business, if the child wants to discharge her 
fiduciary duties fairly, faces a more complex dilemma. That child 
must act both as corporate fiduciary, running the business in the 
best interests of all the stakeholders in the business, and as 
trustee to her sibling, owing undivided loyalty to this one 
shareholder. 
Duties of a corporate fiduciary are much more lenient than 
that of a trustee, and when a person is holding both roles, courts 
are tempted to resolve the dilemma of judging the fiduciarys 
conduct by applying the stricter standard to the fiduciarys 
                                            
1932. Nina Burleigh, The Trouble with Harry Winston, N.Y. MAG., Jan. 18, 1999, at 46, 
49, available at http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/bizfinance/biz/features/1028/. Harry 
Winston, Inc. is known for being the famous diamond dealer of choice for actresses in 
need of Oscar adornments and for anyone rich enough to acquire a diamond tiara. 
Investors to Buy Major Stake of Harry Winston, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at B8. Winston 
donated the Hope Diamond to the Smithsonian Institution, and the song, Diamonds Are a 
Girls Best Friend, includes the line, Talk to me Harry Winston. Id.; JULE STYNE & LEO 
ROBIN, Diamonds Are a Girls Best Friend, on GENTLEMEN PREFER BLONDES (Music Sales 
Corp. 1949). 
 2. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 4849; Joyce Wadler, Tranquility Elusive for Famed 
Jewelers Heir, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at B2. 
 3. In re Winston, 833 N.Y.S.2d 657, 658−59 (App. Div. 2007); Burleigh, supra note 
1, at 49. 
 4. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 49. 
 5. In re Winston, 833 N.Y.S.2d at 658−59; Investors to Buy Major Stake of Harry 
Winston, supra note 1. 
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conduct. However, there are economic reasons why a business 
manager must be given more leeway in running the business 
than a trustee is given in managing a trust. Holding the fiduciary 
to the stricter standard is arguably less protection to the 
beneficiary because the success of the business may be impaired. 
Also to be considered are the intentions of the transferor who set 
up this conflict. If the transferors intent was to allow maximum 
flexibility to the fiduciary child, then that intent may be 
thwarted by the higher standard. On the other hand, application 
of the lower (and some have argued, now nonexistent) corporate 
fiduciary duty ignores the absence of the balancing protections 
available in most corporate settings that offset the fiduciarys 
relative freedom, such as the shareholders ability to sell the 
investment and thus withdraw from the relationship if the 
corporate fiduciary is abusing the freedom.6 The lesser standard 
can therefore leave the uninvolved child with no protection from 
exploitation by the business-manager sibling. The answer cannot 
be as simple as choosing one standard over the other but rather 
requires fashioning a distinct standard that both protects the 
beneficiary and allows sufficient management autonomy to allow 
the business to prosper. 
This is not an easy task, in light of the current uncertainties 
over the appropriate extent of fiduciary duties of both trustees 
and business managers. The tenor of the debate in the trust 
context is much more constrained than in the business fiduciary 
context, in light of the long history of strict duty for trustees, but 
in both arenas the general point at issue is the extent to which 
fiduciary duties should be mandatory and fixed, or waivable like 
contractual terms.7 In the business context, the statutory trend is 
a significant reduction in mandatory fiduciary duties.8 
Family businesses, called the backbone of the [U.S.] 
economy,9 regularly struggle with succession planning, and this 
legal uncertainty can be a significant threat to such a businesss 
                                            
 6. Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 297, 320 (1999) (discussing the limitations of breach of fiduciary duty claims 
and concluding that those limitations have rendered the cause of action almost nonexistent). 
 7. See infra Part II.E. 
 8. See Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, 41 
TULSA L. REV. 451, 45358 (2006) (discussing the shift from fiduciary duties to 
contractualism in the uniform laws); see also Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The New 
Fiduciary Standards Under the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: More 
Bottom Bumping from NCCUSL, 61 ME. L. REV. 27, 28 n.2, 2930, 43 (2009). 
 9. E.g., Matthew Bandyk, How to Keep Drama Out of a Family Business, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 16, 2008), http://money.usnews.com/money/business-
economy/small-business/articles/2008/05/16/how-to-keep-drama-out-of-a-family-business. 
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survival.10 Analysis of the problem would not only be 
advantageous to business succession planning but also can 
advance the continuing scholarly debate regarding the evolution 
of fiduciary duty in the trust and business entity contexts. 
This Article will first summarize the evolution and current 
formulation of duties of trustees and of various business 
managers in the corporate, partnership, and limited liability 
corporation models. It will next explore the theoretical 
approaches to fiduciary duty, how those approaches have affected 
the different roles of trust and corporate fiduciary, and how the 
different theories affect potential future shifting of those duties. 
The Article will then consider the justifications for the discrepancies 
in the different roles in order to determine which level of duties is 
appropriate for the dual-role fiduciary. The next section will visit 
the Winston family saga and similar family-business struggles and 
analyze the dual-role fiduciary and how courts have dealt with 
the conflicting duties. The Article then proposes an approach to 
defining the parameters of such a fiduciarys unique duties. 
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS DEFINED BY A SPECIFIC ROLE 
A. General Principles of Fiduciary Duty 
While a unified definition of fiduciary has yet to be agreed 
upon,11 the essence of a relationship found to be fiduciary is 
open-ended control by one person over property owned by 
another person or other discretionary power of one person over 
another.12 The fiduciary has been entrusted with this power and 
has been given some level of unsupervised discretion, so the label 
of fiduciary, with its attending duties, is imposed to substitute for 
the lack of supervision.13 Once the label of fiduciary attaches, the 
                                            
 10. See Charles D. Fox IV, Non-Tax Considerations in the Succession of Closely Held 
Businesses, in 36 PHILIP E. HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING 9-1, 9-2 to -3 
(Tina Portuondo ed., 2002). 
 11. See P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITIES, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 1, 
24 (T.G. Youdan ed., 1989) (It is striking that a principle so long standing and so widely 
accepted should be the subject of the uncertainty that now prevails.); Robert W. Hillman, 
Closely-Held Firms and the Common Law of Fiduciary Duty: What Explains the Enduring 
Qualities of a Punctilio?, 41 TULSA L. REV. 441, 442 (2006) (As law goes, fiduciary 
doctrine is long on generalities and short on substance.). 
 12. Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. 
U. L. REV. 75, 80, 110, 113 (2004). 
 13. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 105153 (1991) 
(arguing that penalties for self-dealing that are steeper than usual contract damages 
are necessary for deterrence because of the ease of hiding breaches of duty); D. 
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
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person entrusted with the power is encumbered with the duty to 
act unselfishly, and breaches of such duty are punished more 
harshly than mere breaches of contract.14 The extent of the 
unselfishness required depends on the specific relationship.15 The 
more power the fiduciary has, and the less power and control the 
beneficiary of the relationship has, the higher the duty.16 As 
stated by Professor Scott: 
The greater the independent authority to be exercised by 
the fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty. 
Thus, a trustee is under a stricter duty of loyalty than is an 
agent upon whom limited authority is conferred or a 
corporate director who can act only as a member of the 
board of directors or a promoter acting for investors in a 
new corporation.17 
The purpose of the fiduciary label is to prevent abuse of the 
position.18 In economic terms, it can reduce agency costs, the costs of 
separating ownership and management.19 Any time risk-bearing 
(by the equity owners, such as trust beneficiaries or corporate 
stockholders) is separated from managing the assets (delegated to 
the trustee or corporate managers), the managers incentives to get 
the highest return and otherwise protect the assets are weakened 
because any profit (and any loss) goes to the risk-bearer.20 In order 
to avoid loss due to the managers lack of self-interest in the 
transactions, the risk-bearer must monitor the managers 
actions, provide financial incentive, and be able to recover from 
                                            
1399, 1482 (2002) ([T]he purpose of fiduciary duty is to combat opportunism in such 
relationships.). 
 14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 & cmt. a (2007); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 
441 (1993) (stating that damages for breach of contract are usually limited to the 
promisees loss, while damages for breach of fiduciary duty usually include all profits 
obtained by the fiduciary due to the breach). In addition, if a trustee breaches her 
duty of loyalty by self-dealing (i.e., transacting with the trust in her individual 
capacity), then there is no further inquiry and the transaction is voidable by the 
beneficiaries regardless of the fairness of the transaction. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT 
& GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 247−48 (2d 
ed. rev. 1993). 
 15. Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Smith, supra note 13, at 1482. 
 19. Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
621, 623, 677−83 (2004). 
 20. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 277 (1986); see LEX DONALDSON, AMERICAN ANTI-MANAGEMENT 
THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION 165 (1995) (Agency theory tends to see managers as ever 
ready to cheat the principals or owners unless constantly controlled in some way.). 
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the manager for poor performance.21 These agency costs22i.e., 
the costs of maintaining the agency relationshipare a 
consideration whenever risk-bearing and management are 
separated, and fiduciary duty (and potential liability for its 
breach) is one means to keep the manager in check.23 
Essentially, there are two fiduciary duties: the duty of care 
and the duty of loyalty.24 The duty of care is the duty to perform 
competently and includes the duty to carry out the fiduciary 
purposeto be prudent in ones actions; to protect property 
entrusted to the fiduciary in the fiduciary capacity; to earmark 
such property and not to commingle with the fiduciarys own 
assets; to invest such property prudently, which may include a 
duty to diversify; to account to the beneficiaries; and to be 
impartial in the treatment of the persons who hold an interest in 
the fiduciary property.25 The duty of loyalty is the duty of 
unselfishness, the duty to refrain from exploiting the relationship 
for personal gain and to refrain from taking any benefit from the 
relationship other than reasonable compensation.26 Breaches of 
the duty of care generally are punished less severely than 
breaches of the duty of loyalty,27 but the strictness of each duty 
varies significantly depending on the type of fiduciary role.28 
B. Fiduciary Duties of a Trustee 
The trustee is the most vertical of the fiduciary relationships 
because the beneficiary has virtually no control over the trustees 
actions, restricted ability to monitor the trustees actions, and 
restricted ability to exit the relationship by removing the assets 
                                            
 21. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 277−78, 291. 
 22. Michael Jensen and William Meckling, in their classic 1976 essay on agency 
costs, defined agency costs as (1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the 
bonding expenditures by the agent, (3) the residual loss. Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
 23. See Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 677−83 (contrasting the effect of fiduciary rules to 
curb agency costs in trusts and corporations). 
 24. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE 
L.J. 625, 655 (1995) (The law of fiduciary administration . . . resolves into two great 
principles, the duties of loyalty and prudence.). 
 25. 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER, 
SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS §§ 17.3−.15 (5th ed. 2007). 
 26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 & cmt. c(4) (2007); see Karen E. Boxx, Of 
Punctilios and Paybacks: The Duty of Loyalty Under the Uniform Trust Code, 67 MO. L. 
REV. 279, 280−83, 300 (2002). 
 27. Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper 
of Professors Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 325 (1986). 
 28. Scott, supra note 15, at 541. 
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from the trustees control.29 There is also no other monitoring 
mechanism in place to protect the beneficiary, such as court 
supervision in a guardianship or market forces affecting the price 
of stock in a publicly held corporation.30 The trustees fiduciary 
duties are therefore among the most stringent, setting the gold 
standard for fiduciary unselfishness, and all other fiduciary 
relationships descend from that standard.31 
So what is that gold standard? The duties of a trustee will 
primarily be defined by the terms of the individual trust 
instrument.32 However, state statutes and the common law 
provide both default rules, which apply in the absence of 
provisions of the trust instrument, and mandatory rules, which 
apply regardless of the provisions of the trust instrument.33 
A trustees duty of loyalty under common law prohibits 
self-dealing, except when the settlor of the trust authorized the 
transaction or all of the beneficiaries consented after full 
disclosure.34 Self-dealing includes not only transactions between 
the trust and the trustee in her individual capacity, but also 
transactions between the trust and an alter ego of the trustee, 
such as a straw man, close relative, or an entity substantially 
owned by the trustee.35 Whether the relationship between the 
trustee and third party to the transaction is close enough to trigger 
self-dealing rules is usually a question of fact.36 Self-dealing is 
generally prohibited even if the price is set by a third party.37 
If a trustee engages in self-dealing, then the transaction is 
voidable at the option of the beneficiary, regardless of whether 
                                            
 29. See Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 775−77 (2000) (describing the vertical nature of the trusteebeneficiary 
relationship); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 437 (comparing fiduciary 
standards of trustees, partners, and managers). 
 30. See Smith, supra note 13, at 1429 & n.131, 1454; Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, 
Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 57071 (2003) (stating 
that fiduciary obligation is the beneficiaries principal recourse, due to the limits on trust 
beneficiaries control). 
 31. See Smith, supra note 13, at 1452−54 (describing trusts as quintessential 
fiduciary relationships and quoting the Restatement for the proposition that the duties 
of a trustee are more [rigorous] than those of most other fiduciaries (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 32. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 16.1, at 1022; see also John H. 
Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1121−22 (2004). 
 33. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 428−29 (2006); 3 SCOTT, 
FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 16.1, at 1022−23; Langbein, supra note 32, at 1105, 
1112. 
 34. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170(1) cmt. t, 216(1), (2)(b) (1959). 
 35. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, §§ 17.2.1.3 to .4, at 1095−1102. 
 36. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 14, § 543(A), at 281−82. 
 37. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2.1.2, at 1091. 
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the transaction was otherwise fair to the trust.38 The beneficiaries 
have a broad range of remedies, including requiring the trustee to 
pay over to the trust any profit made by the trustee, requiring the 
trustee to return the property to the trust, or requiring the trustee 
to pay into the trust the difference between the fair market value 
and the price paid by the trustee.39 The beneficiaries can also elect 
to confirm the sale if the propertys value drops below what the 
trustee paid.40 Fairness of the transaction to the trust is not a 
defense; the mere fact of self-dealing triggers the beneficiaries 
remedies.41 This no further inquiry rule is justified on the principle 
that it is a breach of the trustees duty merely to put himself in a 
conflict of interest with the trust; taking unfair advantage of the 
conflict is not a necessary element of the breach.42 According to 
Robert Cooter and Bradley Freedmans economic rationale for the 
no further inquiry rule,43 the potential for unfair profit for the self-
dealing trustee is too great, and the likelihood of getting caught is 
too small (because of the obstacles to supervising the trustee), so the 
more common contractual remedy of disgorging only the difference 
between a fair sale and the actual sales price would not be a 
sufficient deterrent to bad behavior.44 The stiffer penalties of the no 
further inquiry rule are therefore necessary to compensate for the 
inadequate supervision. 
Self-dealing may be authorized by the trust instrument,45 but 
the trust instrument cannot relieve the trustee of the duty to act 
in good faith and in furtherance of the trust purposes.46 
                                            
 38. Id. § 17.2, at 1078−80; see Fulton Natl Bank v. Tate, 363 F.2d 562, 571 (5th Cir. 
1966) ([T]he beneficiary need only show that the fiduciary allowed himself to be placed in a 
position where his personal interest might conflict with the interest of the beneficiary. It is 
unnecessary to show that the fiduciary succumbed to this temptation, that he acted in bad 
faith, that he gained an advantage, fair or unfair, that the beneficiary was harmed. Indeed, the 
law presumes that the fiduciary acted disloyally, and inquiry into such matters is foreclosed.). 
 39. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2.1.1, at 1089−90. 
 40. Id. at 1090−91. 
 41. 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS § 170.1, at 316 (4th ed. 1987) (It is now, of course, well settled in the United 
States as well as in England that a sale by a trustee to himself individually can be set 
aside if it was made without the consent of the beneficiaries, even though it was made in 
good faith and for a fair consideration.). 
 42. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2.1, at 1087; see also BOGERT 
& BOGERT, supra note 14, § 543, at 228 ([E]quity deems it better to . . . strike down all 
disloyal acts, rather than to attempt to separate the harmless and the harmful by 
permitting the trustee to justify his representation of two interests.); Sitkoff, supra note 
30, at 573−74. 
 43. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 13, at 105154, 1074. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2.11, at 113839. 
 46. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(2) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 428−29 (2006); 1 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmt. t (1959) (By the terms of the trust the 
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A trustees duty of care is similarly construed very strictly. 
The duty was originally phrased as the duty to exercise such care 
as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with 
his or her own property with an eye towards long-term 
preservation of the estate.47 The prudent person rule has been 
updated to the prudent investor rule, clarifying that the 
trustees decisions should be based on the purposes and 
circumstances of the trust and its beneficiaries.48 The hallmark of 
the trustees duty of care is minimizing risk: [T]he trustee must 
accept only that level of overall risk that is appropriate, in light 
of all the circumstances, for the trust and its beneficiaries.49 The 
trustees duty of care has even been phrased as a duty of 
caution.50 As stated in the comments to the Uniform Prudent 
Investor Act, A trust whose main purpose is to support an 
elderly widow of modest means will have a lower risk tolerance 
than a trust to accumulate for a young scion of great wealth.51 
The duty of care includes the duty to delegate responsibly, 
which originally was the duty not to delegate but which by 
necessity evolved to permission to delegate as long as the trustee 
used reasonable care, skill, and caution in selecting the agent 
and in monitoring the agents actions.52 The reason for this 
evolution was the increasing complexity of financial markets and 
investment decisions, making it necessary for lay trustees to rely 
on advisors.53 The trustees duty of care also includes the duty to 
preserve trust property, which includes the duty to exercise 
reasonable care to keep the property in good repair,54 the duty to 
                                            
trustee may be permitted to sell trust property to himself individually, or as trustee to 
purchase property from himself individually, or to lend to himself money held by him in 
trust, or otherwise to deal with the trust property on his own account. The trustee violates 
his duty to the beneficiary, however, if he acts in bad faith, no matter how broad may be the 
provisions of the terms of the trust in conferring power upon him to deal with the trust 
property on his own account.); 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 41, § 170.9, at 346.  
 47. 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 41, § 174, at 466−68. 
 48. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 & cmt., 7B U.L.A. 20−21 (2006). 
 49. 4 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 19.1.5, at 1399. 
 50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(2) (2007) (The duty of prudence requires 
the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution.); 4 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra 
note 25, § 19.1.5, at 1399 (A trustee must act with reasonable caution.). 
 51. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 21 (2006). 
 52. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(a) & cmt., 7B U.L.A. 39−40 (2006); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80 cmt. d(2) (2007). 
 53. See 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.3, at 1174 ([A] trustee 
may now be under a duty to delegate that which the trustee cannot prudently undertake 
personally.); John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of 
Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 650−52 (1996). 
 54. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.8, at 1215−16. 
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keep and render accounts,55 the duty not to commingle trust 
assets with the trustees personal assets,56 the duty to earmark 
trust assets as belonging to the trust,57 and the duty to make the 
trust property productive.58 The duty to keep trust assets 
separate and earmarked was traditionally read strictly; if there 
was any loss of value of unearmarked or commingled assets, the 
trustee was liable for the loss even if the failure to earmark or 
keep separate was not the cause of the loss.59 For example, the 
trustee who failed to earmark would be liable for a loss due to 
general decline in the stock market. The more modern approach 
is to hold the trustee liable for breach of these duties only if the 
loss was caused by the breach.60 
The trustee has a general duty to diversify trust investments 
in order to minimize risks.61 The trust instrument can relieve the 
trustee of the duty to diversify, but the trustee is still required to 
exercise prudence and caution62 and may still be liable for failing 
to diversify if circumstances indicate that diversification is 
nevertheless necessary to protect trust assets.63 
The duty of care can generally be relaxed by the trust 
instrument, but cannot eliminate the fundamental requirement 
that trustees not behave recklessly but act in good faith, with 
some suitable degree of care, and in a manner consistent with the 
terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the 
beneficiaries.64 An exculpatory clause in the trust instrument 
will be strictly construed and will not be enforced to relieve a 
trustee of liability for gross negligence or deliberate behavior.65 
                                            
 55. Id. § 17.4, at 118688. 
 56. Id. § 17.11.1, at 1228. 
 57. Id. § 17.11.3, at 1233. 
 58. Id. § 17.13, at 1248 (Ordinarily, a trustee has a duty to use reasonable care and 
skill to make the trust property productive in a manner that is consistent with the 
fiduciary duties of caution and impartiality.). 
 59. Id. § 17.11.1, at 1230, § 17.11.3, at 1235. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 4 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 19.2, at 1427; see also Langbein, 
supra note 53, at 646−48. 
 62. 4 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 19.3.2, at 144445. 
 63. See, e.g., Robertson v. Cent. Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 47 F.3d 1268, 1279 (3d 
Cir. 1995); First Ala. Bank of Huntsville, N.A. v. Spragins, 475 So. 2d 512, 516 (Ala. 
1985); In re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332, 337 (N.Y. 1997); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 91 cmt. f (2007) (discussing that while diversification instructions are 
typically permissive, as opposed to mandatory, such permissiveness does not abrogate 
the trustees duty to act prudently . . . because diversification is fundamental to prudent 
risk management). 
 64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 cmt. d (2007). 
 65. 4 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 24.27.2, at 1804. 
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C. Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors and Officers 
In the corporate setting, the board of directors and the 
corporate officers are fiduciaries for the corporation and its 
shareholders and traditionally have been bound by the same 
general notions of a duty of care and a duty of loyalty as 
trustees.66 The fiduciary duties imposed can and should be less 
strict than that of a trustee, for several reasons. First, the 
shareholder is theoretically in a better position to protect his 
interests than a trust beneficiary because of ease of exit from 
the relationship, better monitoring, and general controls of the 
market.67 Also, in the business setting some risk is a necessary 
element, as opposed to the conservative goals of the trust, and 
self-dealing by business managers can benefit the business.68 
Fiduciary duties of corporate managers are currently defined 
much more narrowly and are further weakened by exceptions 
and presumptions in favor of finding no breach of duty.69 In 
addition, state statutes are moving in the direction of diluting 
the duty of loyalty and allowing fiduciary duties to be virtually 
eliminated by contract with the shareholders.70 
The duty of care is particularly weakened in the corporate 
setting. A typical statement of the duty of care is: 
[A] duty to the corporation to perform the directors or 
officers functions in good faith, in a manner that he or 
she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
                                            
 66. See 1 STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 12 (6th ed. 2009) 
(describing the duty of loyalty for directors as the duty to maintain . . . the corporations 
and its shareholders best interests over anyone elses and the duty of care as an 
obligation to act on an informed basis (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 67. See Sitkoff, supra note 30, at 57073 (comparing interests of shareholders and 
trust beneficiaries). But see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 355 (1932) (commenting that passive investors in 
corporations largely surrender the right that the corporation should be operated in their 
sole interest and the protection provided by the community for strict property rights). 
 68. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 437 (giving reasons for variations 
in fiduciary duties of different relationships). 
 69. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate 
Concepts: Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 
111, 14245 (1993) (observing, in RUPA, the shift from a duty of good faith for corporate 
partners to a lesser obligation, the allowance for parties to waive obligations for any 
conduct that is not manifestly unreasonable, and the reduced burden of proof when 
partners act in self-interest (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a history of the 
evolution of fiduciary duty in the corporate context, see id. at 12340. 
 70. See infra notes 9495 and accompanying text; see also Margaret M. Blair  
& Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate 
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1791 (2001) (The net result is that, as a practical matter, a 
negligent director is more likely to be hit by lightning after leaving her board meeting 
than she is to pay damages.). 
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corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent 
person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like 
position and under similar circumstances.71 
The Model Business Corporation Act, aiming to avoid the 
tort law implications of prudent person language,72 phrases the 
standard as the care that a person in a like position would 
reasonably believe appropriate.73 The dilution of the duty 
therefore begins with the basic definition, which is more 
relaxed than the trustees corresponding duty to exercise care 
that a prudent person would exercise in handling his or her 
own affairs or in light of the circumstances of the trust 
beneficiaries.74 
The duty of care in the corporate setting is even further 
softened by the business judgment rule.75 The business 
judgment rule creates a presumption that must be rebutted by 
a party claiming a violation of the duty of care.76 Under the 
business judgment rule, it is presumed that in making a 
business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.77 The 
purpose of the business judgment rule is to allow corporate 
managers sufficient discretion to manage the business 
enterprise while still acknowledging the underlying duty of 
care.78 The rule prevents a court from reviewing the 
substantive merits of a particular board decision as long as the 
procedure in making the decision complied with the 
requirements of the business judgment rule.79 As a result of the 
                                            
 71. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (1992). 
 72. See R. Franklin Balotti & Joseph Hinsey IV, Director Care, Conduct, and Liability: 
The Model Business Corporation Act Solution, 56 BUS. LAW. 35, 41, 50 (2000). 
 73. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2010). 
 74. See supra notes 4551 and accompanying text. 
 75. The business judgment rule has a long history and has generated voluminous 
scholarly analysis. The complexities of the rule are beyond the scope of this Article. For a 
thorough analysis, see 1 RADIN, supra note 66, at 2628. 
 76. Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
787, 791 (1999). 
 77. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 78. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (The business judgment rule exists to protect and 
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to . . . directors. (citing 
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981))); see also United Copper Sec. Co. v. 
Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 26364 (1917) (Courts interfere seldom to control 
such discretion intra vires the corporation, except where the directors are guilty of misconduct 
equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation which prevents an 
unprejudiced exercise of judgment . . . .). 
 79. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989). 
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business judgment rule, director negligence would have to be 
gross rather than ordinary negligence to result in any 
liability.80 
In addition to the relaxed standard of care and the 
presumption that due care was taken in all decisionmaking, 
directors may also be protected from liability for duty of care 
violations if the corporation has chosen to adopt a charter 
provision limiting director liability.81 Under most state statutes, a 
corporation may provide in its articles of incorporation that 
directors shall not be liable for fiduciary violations, with certain 
specific exceptions, such as violations of the duty of loyalty, 
actions made in bad faith, and fiduciary violations that are 
unlawful.82 
So-called exoneration provisions were first authorized by 
statute in Delaware.83 The Delaware legislature was concerned 
about the holding in Smith v. Van Gorkom, where the Supreme 
Court of Delaware held directors liable for not exercising due 
care in approving a merger transaction.84 Van Gorkom was seen 
as a judicial stretching of director liability, leaving existing and 
potential directors of Delaware corporations feeling very 
vulnerable.85 Adding to the director liability crisis was the 
increasing cost and, in some cases, unavailability of director and 
officer insurance.86 The legislature swiftly enacted a new 
provision to its corporate code, which allows corporations to 
include in the articles of incorporation 
                                            
 80. Carter G. Bishop, A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability in Business 
Organization Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 477, 483 (2006). 
 81. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and 
Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1210 (1988). 
 82. See id. at 121012; see also Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: 
Managerial Liability and Exculpatory ClausesA Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing 
Officer Protection, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 307, 313 & nn.4849 (2006) (discussing and listing 
the charter-option statutes of forty-four states). 
 83. 65 Del. Laws 544 (1986) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) 
(2011)); see E. Norman Veasey, Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional 
Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 12 WASH. U. J.L.  
& POLY 1, 1011 (2003). 
 84. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873, 893 (Del. 1985), overruled on other 
grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 85. See Florence Shu-Acquaye, Smith v. Van Gorkom Revisited: Lessons Learned in 
Light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2004 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 19, 36 (discussing 
directors heightened vulnerability to liability for breach of the fiduciary duty of care in 
the wake of Van Gorkom); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of 
Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783, 79394 (1994). 
 86. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors 
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 415 (2005); see Deborah 
Cahalane, Comment, 1986 Ohio Corporation Amendments: Expanding the Scope of 
Director Immunity, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 671 (1987). 
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[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a 
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided 
that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of 
a director: (i) For any breach of the directors duty of loyalty to 
the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions 
not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a 
knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title 
[(unlawful payment of dividends and unlawful stock 
redemption)]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the 
director derived an improper personal benefit.87 
All of the other states quickly followed Delawares lead and 
enacted similar exoneration statutes,88 and many have enacted 
other provisions expanding the corporations authority to indemnify 
directors and officers against liability,89 capping damages,90 and in 
some instances limiting liability for all directors to willful 
misconduct or recklessness, without requiring the corporation to 
elect into limited liability in the charter.91 The current state of the 
duty of care is that of a tepid constraint on director behavior. One 
commentator remarked that the corporate directors duty of care is 
spoken of in unusually shrunken terms.92 
The duty of loyalty is also much less strict in the corporate 
setting. Unlike the trustee, who is forbidden from self-dealing and is 
subject to the no further inquiry rule, which makes fairness of the 
transaction irrelevant,93 a director engaging in self-dealing has 
almost always been allowed to avoid liability by showing procedural 
and substantive fairness of the transaction.94 Substantive fairness 
has even been dropped as a requirement in most state statutes, 
                                            
 87. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (2011). 
 88. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the 
Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 33132 & n.93 (2004); Hanks, 
supra note 81, at 1209. 
 89. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-851 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.  
& ASSNS § 2-418 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2011); see also Hanks, supra note 81, at 1221. 
 90. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (2011). 
 91. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0831(1)(2) (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) 
(LexisNexis 2010). Some states with automatic limitation of liability allow the corporation 
to opt out of the limitation in the charter. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.345, .355 (West 
Supp. 2011). 
 92. Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 28 (2003). It should also be noted that although Sarbanes-Oxley imposes 
significant duties of oversight on corporate directors, it imposes no corresponding liability for 
breach of those duties, even though corporate officers incur personal liability for breaching the 
statute. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, §§ 302, 307, 906, 116 Stat. 
745, 777, 784, 806 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7245 (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). 
 93. See supra notes 3242 and accompanying text. 
 94. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: Independent Directors 
and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 5859 (20062007). 
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which allow a director to engage in self-dealing with the corporation 
if the transaction is approved by a majority of disinterested 
directors or shareholders, or even if not so approved, if a court finds 
that the transaction was fair to the corporation.95 
State statutes generally do not state an affirmative duty of 
loyalty for corporate managers but many do prohibit certain 
breaches of that duty.96 Nevertheless, the duty of loyalty, even in 
the more liberal corporate environment and with the recent trend 
of confining duties, is not limited to a checklist of violations. As 
Justice Cardozo stated, Equity refuses to confine within the 
bounds of classified transactions its precept of a loyalty that is 
undivided and unselfish.97 
The Delaware courts have added another aspect of the duty 
of loyalty: the duty to act in good faith.98 In the much-discussed 
Disney litigation involving the hiring and firing of Michael 
Ovitz, the court of chancery initially labeled good faith as a 
third fiduciary duty.99 Although the court acknowledged that 
previous Delaware decisions were unclear as to whether a 
separate duty existed, calling it a fog of . . . hazy 
jurisprudence, the court concluded that the concept of 
intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for ones 
responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the only) 
standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in 
good faith.100 Shortly after the Disney court of chancery 
opinion was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, the 
supreme court further clarified the role of good faith in Stone 
v. Ritter.101 The Stone court called good faith a subsidiary 
element[,] i.e., a condition, of the fundamental duty of 
loyalty.102 
                                            
 95. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011); Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 
A.2d 557, 562 (Del. 1999); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 365 (Del. 
1993), modified on other grounds, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 8.61(b) (2010); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 5.1 (1986) (reviewing the 
evolution of voidability of interested director transactions); 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER  
& DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 4.05, at 4-13 
(7th ed. 2006); Brown, supra note 94, at 60. 
 96. See Hanks, supra note 81, at 121112. 
 97. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928). 
 98. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(identifying a good faith require[ment] of a corporate fiduciary that is distinct from the 
duties of care and loyalty), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 99. Id. at 697, 745. 
 100. Id. at 75355. 
 101. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 102. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 
(Del. Ch. 2003)); see also Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 
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D. Fiduciary Duties of Managers and Owners of Unincorporated 
Entities 
The various forms of unincorporated entities, such as family 
limited partnerships and limited liability companies, are 
extremely important when considering the ramifications of 
holding dual fiduciary positions because of the increasing 
popularity of these entity forms in estate planning and family 
business planning.103 
1. General Partnerships. The evolution of fiduciary duties 
in this context began with the general partnership.104 In a classic 
partnership, the balance of power among participants is much 
closer to the horizontal contract model and farther from the 
vertical trust model because all parties have power over the 
organization and each other.105 Therefore, because the parties 
serve as fiduciaries to each other, and because each fiduciary also 
holds a beneficial interest in the enterprise (aligning the 
fiduciarys interest with the beneficiarys), the fiduciary duties 
will be less strict than those imposed on a trustee.106 However, 
despite the fact that each partner is subject to personal liability 
for actions of the other partners, a partners fiduciary duty was 
traditionally considered stricter than that of a corporate director 
or officer.107 
It was in a case involving a partnership that Judge Cardozo 
made his classic statement of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which 
                                            
43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 470 (2009). 
 103. See JOHN R. PRICE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE 
PLANNING § 11.1, at 11-4 (2010 ed.) (Most commonly, the family entity takes the form of 
a so-called family limited partnership (FLP), but they can be (and many times are) in the 
form of any limited liability entity, including the LLC and the S corporation.); Kenneth 
P. Brier & Joseph B. Darby, III, Family Limited Partnerships: Decanting Family 
Investment Assets into New Bottles, 49 TAX LAW. 127, 128 (1995). 
 104. See Brier & Darby, supra note 103, at 140 (explaining that the Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act defined limited partnerships through reference to general partnerships). 
 105. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 43233. 
 106. See id. at 43234 (listing various fiduciary relationships and the variations in 
their duties). A similar relationship, when courts have taken an even more relaxed view of 
the parties fiduciary duties, is the duty owed by spouses in community property states in 
dealing with the community property. See Lisa R. Mahle, A Purse of Her Own: The Case 
Against Joint Bank Accounts, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 45, 54 (2006) (stating that California 
is the only state to have given robust legal content to the business partnership analogy 
to the spousal relationship); see also Alexandria Streich, Comment, Spousal Fiduciaries in 
the Marital Partnership: Marriage Means Business but the Sharks Do Not Have a Code of 
Conduct, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 367, 379 (1998). 
 107. See Sandra K. Miller, What Buy-Out Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Dissolution 
Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability 
Company?, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 413, 448 (2001). 
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continues to be cited regularly by the courts in all categories of 
fiduciary cases.108 In Meinhard v. Salmon, two partners leased a 
building and subleased to shops and offices.109 Before termination 
of the lease, the partner managing the enterprise entered into a 
new lease with the property owner that did not include the other 
partner.110 In condemning this misappropriation of the ventures 
business opportunity, Judge Cardozo stated: 
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one 
another . . . the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of 
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting 
at arms length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary 
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the 
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the 
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the 
standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a 
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. 
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts 
of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of 
undivided loyalty by the disintegrating erosion of 
particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct 
for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that 
trodden by the crowd.111 
The common law therefore initially viewed fiduciary 
duties of participants in unincorporated entities as an 
essential part of the relationship. The Uniform Partnership 
Act (UPA), applicable to general partnerships,112 was 
introduced in 1914 and did not specifically define the scope of 
fiduciary duties of partners.113 Instead, it incorporated the law 
of agency114 and specified only that a partner was 
[a]ccountable as a [f]iduciary and must account to the 
partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any 
profits derived by him without the consent of the other 
partners from any transaction connected with . . . the 
                                            
 108. See Hillman, supra note 11, at 443 (acknowledging Justice Cardozos standard 
as the controlling precedent in fiduciary duty litigation). 
 109. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 54546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 110. Id. at 546. 
 111. Id. (citation omitted). 
 112. General partnership is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as: A partnership in 
which all partners participate fully in running the business and share equally in profits 
and losses (though the partners monetary contributions may vary). BLACKS LAW 
DICTIONARY 1230 (9th ed. 2009). 
 113. UNIF. PSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. (2001); J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, 
Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships: The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 448 (1997). 
 114. UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 4(3), 6 U.L.A. 386 (2001). 
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partnership.115 The UPA was not revised until 1992, and the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), in response to 
concerns about galloping Meinhardism,116 took a very different 
approach to defining a partners fiduciary duty. Section 404 
limits a partners duty of loyalty to: a duty to account to the 
partnership and hold as trustee for it any property acquired 
personally by the partner in connection with the partnerships 
business; a prohibition on dealing with the partnership as or on 
behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership; 
and a prohibition against competing with the partnership.117 
RUPA further narrows the duty of loyalty by allowing for 
some self-dealing: 
A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under 
this [Act] or under the partnership agreement merely 
because the partners conduct furthers the partners own 
interest.  
A partner may lend money to and transact other 
business with the partnership, and as to each loan or 
transaction the rights and obligations of the partner are the 
same as those of a person who is not a partner, subject to 
other applicable law.118  
The second aspect of a partners duty of loyaltydealing 
with the partnership as someone with an adverse interestis 
therefore not the broad prohibition on self-dealing that it might 
appear to be, since loaning money or otherwise transacting 
business with the partnership would arguably give the partner 
an interest adverse to the partnership. The RUPA comments 
make clear that in this area, a partner is not like a trustee: 
A partner as such is not a trustee and is not held to the 
same standards as a trustee. Subsection (e) makes clear 
that a partners conduct is not deemed to be improper 
merely because it serves the partners own individual 
interest. 
That admonition has particular application to the duty of 
loyalty and the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. It 
                                            
 115. UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 194 (2001). That language was read by the courts 
not to limit a partners fiduciary responsibilities to that specified duty, but rather was read as 
confirmation of a broad duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 54546; Dickerson, 
supra note 69, at 114. 
 116. Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with 
the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 162728 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404(b) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001). 
 118. UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404(e)(f) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001) (alteration in 
original). 
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underscores the partners rights as an owner and principal in 
the enterprise, which must always be balanced against his 
duties and obligations as an agent and fiduciary. For example, 
a partner who, with consent, owns a shopping center may, 
under subsection (e), legitimately vote against a proposal by 
the partnership to open a competing shopping center.119  
The RUPA drafters therefore made specific accommodation 
to the fiduciary responsibility in light of the unavoidable conflict 
of being both fiduciary and joint owner. With respect to duty of 
care, RUPA states that a partners duty is limited to refraining 
from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, 
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.120 
Therefore, ordinary negligence of a partner will not expose her to 
liability, unless the partnership agreement creates a higher duty 
of care than the statute.121 The gross negligence standard for 
partners has been likened to the standard applied to corporate 
directors, which is ordinary negligence but lessened considerably 
by the business judgment rule.122 
In addition to the stated duties of loyalty and care, RUPA 
requires that a partners actions with respect to the partnership 
shall be consistent with the obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing.123 The requirement of good faith is arguably not a 
fiduciary duty but rather the baseline duty owed in all 
contractual relationships.124 
As to waiver, RUPA provides that the duty of loyalty cannot be 
entirely eliminated by the partnership agreement, but that the 
agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities 
that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly 
unreasonable,125 and that all the partners, or a lesser number 
                                            
 119. UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 5 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 146 (2001). 
 120. UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404(c) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 73, 143 (2001). 
 121. See UNIF. PSHIP ACT §§ 103, 404(c) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001). 
 122. PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 402 cmt. (1992), reprinted in 3 LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES app. c, at c-45 (2011). 
 123. UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404(d) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001). 
 124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); Dibadj, supra note 8, at 
461. Whether this duty of good faith is higher than the contractual duty of good faith and 
whether good faith is a third, separate fiduciary duty is a matter of some controversy. See 
Dickerson, supra note 69, at 13336. The RUPA comments, however, specify that the duty 
of good faith imposed by Section 404 is the contractual duty: The obligation of good faith 
and fair dealing is a contract concept, imposed on the partners because of the consensual 
nature of a partnership. It is not characterized, in RUPA, as a fiduciary duty arising out 
of the partners special relationship. UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 4 (amended 1997), 6 
U.L.A. 145 (2001) (citation omitted). 
 125. UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 103(b)(3) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001). 
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specified in the agreement, may authorize or ratify a specific act or 
transaction that would be a violation of the duty of loyalty, after full 
disclosure of all material facts.126 The duty to act in good faith 
cannot be waived, but the partnership agreement may prescribe 
the standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be 
measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.127 
2. Limited Partnerships. General partnerships have the 
disadvantage of exposing all partners to personal liability,128 so 
other forms of unincorporated entities were devised that retained 
the pass-through taxation of a partnership but allowed for 
limited liability similar to corporations.129 The first of these was 
the limited partnership.130 A limited partnership requires at least 
one general partner, who has personal liability, and at least one 
limited partner, whose liability is limited to his or her 
investment in the partnership.131 
The first Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) was 
promulgated in 1916 and revised in 1976.132 In 1985, the Act was 
substantially amended, and that new version was known as the 
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA).133 The Uniform 
Act was again amended in 2001, and that revision is commonly 
referred to as Re-RULPA.134 The most significant aspect of Re-
RULPA was delinking the Limited Partnership Act from RUPA and 
creating a new stand-alone act.135 Limited partners owe no fiduciary 
duties to other partners or to the partnership, according to the Act, 
                                            
 126. Id. Note that the ability of the partners to ratify or authorize in advance certain 
transactions is consistent with trust beneficiaries ability to do the same. See UNIF. TRUST 
CODE § 1009 (amended 2001), 7C U.L.A. 656 (2006). 
 127. UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 103(b)(5) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001). 
 128. WILLIAM GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 206, at 334 (3d ed. 
2001). 
 129. Carter G. Bishop, Unincorporated Limited Liability Business Organizations: 
Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 985, 98991, 997, 
1004 (1995). 
 130. Id. at 989. For an overview of the limited partnership and the other 
unincorporated business entities discussed in this section, see id. at 9931004. See 
also LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS 
ENTITIES § 11.01 (4th ed. 2009), for additional background and history of the limited 
partnership. 
 131. William P. Streng, Choice of Entity, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) No. 700-3d, at A-11 
(2007). 
 132. See UNIF. LTD. PSHIP ACT prefatory note (amended 1985), 6B U.L.A. 4 (2008). 
 133. Id.; Thomas E. Geu & Barry B. Nekritz, Expectations for the Twenty-First 
Century: An Overview of the New Limited Partnership Act, PROB. & PROP., Jan.Feb. 2002, 
at 47, 47 (2002). 
 134. UNIF. LTD. PSHIP ACT (amended 2001), 6A U.L.A. (2008); Geu & Nekritz, supra 
note 133, at 47. 
 135. UNIF. LTD. PSHIP ACT prefatory note (2001). 
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and are free to further their own interests.136 Although Re-RULPA 
now contains its own statement of the general partners duties, it 
borrows the RUPA provisions almost word for word.137 The only 
difference between Re-RULPAs section on fiduciary duties of 
general partners and RUPAs section on partners fiduciary duties is 
the omission in Re-RULPA of the specific authorization for a 
partner to lend money to and transact other business with the 
partnership.138 RUPA therefore has a more permissive attitude 
towards self-dealing, which may be because of the difference in 
power in a limited partnership. The fiduciary standard should be 
higher in a limited partnership because the general partner has 
independent authority and the limited partner lacks management 
power, thus coming closer to a trusteebeneficiary relationship.139 
Re-RULPA also incorporates, word for word, RUPAs gross 
negligence standard for a general partners duty of care.140 
3. Limited Liability Companies. Surpassing the limited 
partnership in current popularity is the limited liability company 
(LLC).141 The LLCs attractiveness lies in its combination of the 
                                            
 136. UNIF. LTD. PSHIP ACT § 305 (amended 2001), 6A U.L.A. 424 (2008). 
 137. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Users Guide to the New Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 583, 60708 (2004). 
 138. Compare UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404(f) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001) 
(permitting partners to lend money to and transact other business with the 
partnership), with UNIF. LTD. PSHIP ACT § 408 (amended 2001), 6A U.L.A. 43940 (2008) 
(lacking the explicit authorization found in RUPA). 
 139. GREGORY, supra note 128, § 264, at 438. Re-RULPA assumed that limited 
partnerships currently would be used in settings where the limited partners had virtually 
no management power: 
This Act therefore targets two types of enterprises that seem largely beyond the 
scope of LLPs and LLCs: (i) sophisticated, manager-entrenched commercial deals 
whose participants commit for the long term, and (ii) estate planning 
arrangements (family limited partnerships). This Act accordingly assumes that, 
more often than not, people utilizing it will want: 
• strong centralized management, strongly entrenched, and 
• passive investors with little control over or right to exit the entity[.] 
The Acts rules, and particularly its default rules, have been designed to reflect 
these assumptions.  
UNIF. LTD. PSHIP ACT prefatory note (2001). 
 140. Compare UNIF. LTD. PSHIP ACT § 408(c) (amended 2001), 6A U.L.A. 439 (2008) 
(A general partners duty of care to the limited partnership . . . is limited to refraining 
from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a 
knowing violation of law.), with UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404(c) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 
(2001) (A partners duty of care to the partnership . . . is limited to refraining from 
engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing 
violation of law.). 
 141. See PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 103, § 11.1.1, at 11-5 (Propelled by tax and 
nontax considerations and considerable hype, the LLC has become the vehicle of choice.); 
David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should 
Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility 
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best features of two entities: it offers pass-through taxation, like 
a partnership, and limited liability for all participants, like a 
corporation.142 The Uniform Law Commissioners responded to the 
surge of interest in LLCs in 1996 with the Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act, which was revised in 2006.143 Because the 
LLC is somewhat of a hybrid of a corporation and a 
partnership,144 the fiduciary duties owed by ownersmanagers 
could draw from either the corporate or partnership model,145 and 
the Act chose to straddle the forms in at least one respect. 
Fiduciary duties under the Act depend on whether the company 
is managed by all members (a member-managed limited liability 
company) or is managed by a group of managers elected by 
members (a manager-managed limited liability company).146 In 
a manager-managed company, members who are not managers 
(like shareholders in a public corporation) owe no fiduciary duty 
to the other members or the company.147 Under the original Act, 
managers of a manager-managed company and all members of a 
member-managed company were held to exactly the same duties 
as a partner under RUPA.148 The 2006 revisions changed the 
                                            
and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 447 
& n.108 (1998) (The LLC has spread like wildfire throughout the country.); Howard M. 
Friedman, The Silent LLC RevolutionThe Social Cost of Academic Neglect, 38 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 35 (2004) (The Limited Liability Company (LLC) has become the 
dominant form for newly-created small businesses in a clear majority of the states . . . . 
Nationwide, over 45% of new businesses are LLCs.); Sandra K. Miller, A New Direction 
for LLC Research in a Contractarian Legal Environment, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 351, 35864 
(2003) (summarizing the evolution of the LLC); see also UNIF. LTD. PSHIP ACT prefatory 
note (2001) (The new Act has been drafted for a world in which limited liability 
partnerships and limited liability companies can meet many of the needs formerly met by 
limited partnerships.). 
 142. Elliot Manning, PartnershipsConceptual Overview, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 710 
T.M., at A-61 (2010); Streng, supra note 131, at A-13. 
 143. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT, 6B U.L.A. (2008). 
 144. Claire Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized: Fiduciary Duties Under the 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 417, 42223, 428 (1995). 
 145. See Cohen, supra note 141, at 461. 
 146. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 102(10), (12) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 429 (2008). 
 147. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(g)(5) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 489 (2008) (A 
member does not have any fiduciary duty to the company or to any other member solely 
by reason of being a member.). This release from duty is also identical to that granted 
limited partners under ULPA 2001. UNIF. LTD. PSHIP ACT § 305(a) (amended 2001), 6A 
U.L.A. 424 (2008) (A limited partner does not have any fiduciary duty to the limited 
partnership or to any other partner solely by reason of being a limited partner.). 
 148. Compare UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409, 6B U.L.A. 59798 (2008) (A members 
[and managers] duty of loyalty . . . is limited to . . . account[ing] to the 
company[,] . . . refrain[ing] from dealing with the company[,] . . . [and] refrain[ing] from 
competing with the company[,] . . . [and a] members [and managers] duty of care . . . is 
limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional 
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.), with UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404 (amended 1997), 
6 U.L.A. 143 (2001) (same, for partners and partnerships). Interestingly, the ULLCA 
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fiduciary duties of managers in a manager-managed LLC and 
members in a member-managed LLC in several important 
respects. First, the duty of care is simple negligence rather than 
gross negligence, but the business judgment rule applies.149 
Parties may opt out of the statutory standard of care, but the 
standard of care cannot be completely eliminated, and the new 
standard of care may not be manifestly unreasonable and may 
not authorize intentional misconduct or knowing violation of 
law.150 As for the duty of loyalty, the new Act lists the same 
specific prohibitions as in RUPA, ULPA, and the original 
ULLCA, but does not make the list exclusive.151 The original 
approach was to cabin the duty of loyalty to prohibit only 
specified transactions, but the drafters of the new Act decided 
that: (i) the corral created by RUPA does not fit in the very 
complex and variegated world of LLCs; and (ii) it is impracticable 
to cabin all LLC-related fiduciary duties within a statutory 
formulation.152 In addition, the new Act eliminated the confusing 
inconsistency of RUPA by omitting the RUPA, ULLCA, and 
ULPA provisions that allowed a partner to do business with and 
lend money to the entity.153 
E. Underlying Theories of Fiduciary Duty in the Business and 
Trust Contexts 
As law goes, fiduciary doctrine is long on generalities and 
short on substance.154 
One critical difference between the duties of a trustee and 
the duties of a corporate fiduciary is the extent to which the 
duties may be waived. The theoretical discussions of the nature 
of the fiduciary duty generally offer some insight into the role of 
waivability of duties in both contexts. The nature of the fiduciary 
                                            
picked up the RUPA language that specifically authorizes a member to make loans to and 
transact other business with the company. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(f) (amended 
2006), 6B U.L.A. 59798 (2008); UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 
(2001). This is understandable in the member-managed LLC, which is more like a general 
partnership, but puzzling for manager-managed LLCs, which are more like limited 
partnerships. 
 149. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(c) & cmt. (c) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 48990 
(2008). 
 150. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110(d), (g) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 44344 (2008). 
 151. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 & cmts. (a)(b) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 48890 
(2008). 
 152. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 cmts. (a)(b) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 490 
(2008). 
 153. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(e) & cmt. (e) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 489, 
49192 (2008). 
 154. Hillman, supra note 11, at 442. 
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principle is regularly debated by scholars,155 and a common theme is 
whether fiduciary duties are mandatory duties, required by the 
relationship, or only implied contract terms, which the law imposes 
because the parties would have included them as express terms if 
they would have been aware of their necessity.156 Under the latter 
theory, fiduciary rules are default rules and can be waived by 
express terms of the contract.157 Proponents of this theory, the so-
called contractarians, argue that fiduciary duty is just a gap-filler 
contract term.158 As explained by Easterbrook and Fischel: 
When the task is complex, when efforts will span a 
substantial time, . . . a detailed contract would be silly. 
When one party hires the others knowledge and expertise, 
there is not much they can write down. Instead of specific 
undertakings, the agent [(the manager in corporations, the 
trustee in the law of trusts)] assumes a duty of loyalty in 
pursuit of the objective and a duty of care [(prudence in the 
law of trusts)] in performance . . . [T]he process is 
contractualbecause both principal and agent enter this 
understanding for gain . . . . 
. . . [A] fiduciary relation is a contractual one 
characterized by unusually high costs of specification and 
monitoring. The duty of loyalty replaces detailed 
contractual terms . . . .159 
Under this theory, the parties to the relationship should be free 
to weigh the agency costs, e.g., the costs of delegating management 
of assets to a person other than the owner, which are lessened by 
fiduciary duty, against the costs of heightened liability of the 
fiduciary created by fiduciary duties.160 If there is little risk that the 
fiduciary will abuse the power, then the agency costs are low and 
the beneficiary would want to, and should be able to, waive the 
higher level of fiduciary duties, which are expensive.161 
                                            
 155. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 69, at 13032 (describing the beliefs of three 
schools of thought . . . on the development of fiduciary duties in corporate law: the 
contractarians, . . . anti-contractarians, and the self-styled centrists); see also Smith, 
supra note 13, at 140102 (proposing a unified theory of fiduciary duty). 
 156. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 123132 
(1995). 
 157. See id.; Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A 
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 44850 (1998). 
 158. Dickerson, supra note 69, at 112, 130; Frankel, supra note 156, at 123132. 
 159. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 42627. 
 160. See id. at 42627 (citing to Coase and describing the fiduciary relationship as a 
contractual one, having high transaction and monitoring costs that the parties should 
weigh in making an agreement). 
 161. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 546 (1997). 
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Other theorists have objected to the contractarian approach 
and assert that fiduciary duties are mandatory, required by the 
imbalance of power in the relationship.162 Under this view, 
although the duties can perhaps be reduced, they cannot be 
eliminated by contract.163 These commentators argue that 
fiduciary duties are unlike contractual duties, in that they are 
imposed in some circumstances even if the parties would have 
waived or in fact attempted to waive them, in order to avoid 
abuse of power.164 Under this view, the vertical nature of 
fiduciary relationships, as opposed to the presumed horizontal, 
equal-bargaining-power relationship of contracting parties, 
requires an external imposition of protections.165 
These two positions have been discussed at length in both 
the trust and business fiduciary context and in the corporate 
fiduciary context. The contractarian approach has had a 
significant tangible effect on the evolution of business entity 
statutes addressing fiduciary duties.166 The evolving view of the 
business entity as a nexus of contracts,167 growing out of the 
influence of economics on business law encouraged by Ronald H. 
Coases famous article, The Nature of the Firm,168 gave rise to the 
general contractarian theory of corporations, which posits that no 
rules governing corporations should be mandatory, and that 
parties should be free to create their own contract with minimal 
judicial or statutory requirements.169 The primary justification for 
the contractarian view is cost: mandatory rules, particularly 
fiduciary duty rules, will increase the parties transaction costs, 
which will in turn be passed on to consumers.170 The overarching 
                                            
 162. Alexander, supra note 29, at 77677. 
 163. E.g., id. at 776; Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary 
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 92123. See generally Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary 
Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1999) (describing fiduciary 
relationships to be grounded in areas outside of contract law and utility theories). 
 164. DeMott, supra note 163, at 887; see also Alexander, supra note 29, at 77778. 
 165. See Alexander, supra note 29, at 77678; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of 
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 249 (1995); FitzGibbon, supra 
note 163, at 338. 
 166. See Dickerson, supra note 69, at 13640. 
 167. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1416, 1426 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); Douglas M. Branson, 
Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty 
Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 395 n.95 (1988). 
 168. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 54748, 552 (2003). See generally R.H. 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 169. See Miller, supra note 116, at 161517.  
 170. Dickerson, supra note 144, at 45355; Miller, supra note 116, at 1618; Ribstein, 
supra note 161, at 54144. 
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contractarian view of business organizations embraced the 
contractarian view of the fiduciary principle. This view took hold 
in Delaware, resulting in statutes that severely limit fiduciary 
duties of business managers and allow for almost complete 
contractual waiver.171 The contractarian approach, as codified, 
applies equally to public corporations as well as closely held 
corporations, with some exceptions,172 and has also been extended 
to unincorporated business associations, as noted above.173 
The contractarian view has also been raised in the context of 
trustee duties, which is the strictest of fiduciary roles.174 It is 
difficult to support the notion of freedom of contract in this 
context, because the fiduciary principle is here intended to 
protect the interests of the beneficiaries, who had no part in the 
contract. However, John Langbein has argued that the intent of 
the trustor can be diluted by strict application of the duty of 
loyalty, and that the mandatory duty should bend in the face of 
contrary trustor intent.175 
Professor Langbeins position has yet to make an impact 
on judicial decisions, but codifications of the duty of loyalty in 
the trust arena have to some extent cut back on the common 
law duty. The Uniform Trust Code (UTC), adopted in twenty-
three states,176 codifies the duty of loyalty and changes the self-
dealing rule177 to apply only to transactions with the actual 
trustee.178 Common law would extend the self-dealing 
prohibition to close affiliates of the trustee,179 but the UTC 
provides that for close-affiliate transactions, the trustee can 
defend the self-dealing by arguing fairness of the transaction, 
a defense traditionally not available for self-dealing.180 
                                            
 171. See Miller, supra note 116, at 161517. 
 172. The oppression doctrine, discussed infra notes 221223 and accompanying text, 
is one exception.  
 173. See supra notes 16671 and accompanying text.  
 174. Langbein, supra note 24, at 65859. 
 175. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or 
Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 98082 (2005); see also Langbein, supra note 24, at 659. 
 176. Legislative Fact SheetTrust Code, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20Code (last visited Apr. 8, 
2012). 
 177. See supra notes 3444 and accompanying text. 
 178. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 & cmt. (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 58889, 59091 
(2006). 
 179. See Langbein, supra note 175, at 979 (arguing that the Uniform Trust Code is a 
departure from the common laws sole interest rule in favor of a standard that recognizes 
circumstances in which the overlap of interest may benefit the beneficiary). 
 180. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(c)(d) & cmt. (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 58889, 591 
(2006); Boxx, supra note 26, at 29899. 
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The debate rages on in the realm of business organizations. 
The contractarians seem to be carrying the day, in light of the 
current statutes, but the position is continually criticized by 
scholars.181 In particular, the extension of the contractarian 
approach to closely held business entities has been criticized, 
primarily based on the differences between the relationship of a 
publicly held corporations managers and its shareholders and 
the relationship between managers and owners of closely held 
entities.182 The most recent of the uniform statutes, RULLCA, 
showed a retreat from the strict contractarian approach,183 but 
was also criticized for adding the business judgment rule, thus 
diluting the move toward a more stringent duty.184 The trend, 
however, seems to be in the direction of continued loosening of 
the mandatory duties, and that punctilio of honor continues to 
retreat in the face of market forces.185 The theoretical 
underpinnings of statutory definitions of the duty thus 
demonstrate that the gap between trustee duties and those of 
business fiduciaries will stay wide, continuing to obscure the 
dual-role fiduciarys proper course of action. 
F. Comparison of the Various Definitions of Fiduciary Duty 
It is tempting for courts faced with the dual-purpose 
fiduciary simply to reach for the stricter duty, assuming that is 
the safe choice. However, the relaxed standard for business 
fiduciaries is not just a result of honoring freedom of contract, 
but in fact protects key aspects of successful business 
management. To prevent a court from reaching for the 
deceptively simple and seemingly safe choice, it is imperative to 
analyze the reasons for the gaps between the two categories of 
duties and the purposes that fiduciary duties play in each. 
The basis of general rules governing a fiduciarys behavior is 
an assumption that in order to act in the beneficiarys interest, 
the fiduciary must eliminate and avoid any conflicting personal 
                                            
 181. E.g., Dibadj, supra note 8, at 45859, 47576 (criticizing the contractarian 
approach for muddl[ing] doctrine, espous[ing] antiquated economics, and reflect[ing] poor 
public policy); Allan W. Vestal, Advancing the Search for Compromise: A Response to 
Professor Hynes, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 70 (1995). 
 182. E.g., Sandra K. Miller, Fiduciary Duties in the LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to 
Protect the Interests of Others Beyond the Contracting Parties, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 243, 25557 
(2009) (highlighting the asymmetries in information and inequalities between parties to 
transactions involving closely held business entities). 
 183. See supra notes 14653 and accompanying text. 
 184. Campbell, supra note 8, at 30, 42. 
 185. Dibadj, supra note 8, at 45556. 
Do Not Delete  4/29/2012 5:25 PM 
2012] TOO MANY TIARAS 261 
interests.186 This is in contrast to parties to a contract, who are 
expected to have self-interests in the transaction and are bound 
only by a duty of good faith not to pursue those interests 
unfairly.187 There is undoubtedly a level of self-interest with 
fiduciaries; however, trustees are allowed to charge fees, and 
corporate managers work for salaries and are likely to have 
personal investments in the business enterprise.188 The problem 
lies in defining how much self-interest ought to be tolerated. 
The agency cost of the relationship is the lack of monitoring 
that would prevent the fiduciary from pursuing self-interest to an 
unfair degree and taking advantage of the position.189 To 
compensate for the lack of monitoring, the fiduciary principle 
imposes heightened duties and liabilities to work as a 
disincentive.190 For example, if a trustee is not subject to the no 
further inquiry rule, then a trustee may be tempted to self-deal.191 
She might give herself a sweetheart deal, with the knowledge 
that it is likely the transaction will not come to light, and that if 
it did, she would only have to compensate the trust for its loss 
(i.e., the difference between fair price and what the trustee 
actually paid). The no further inquiry rule increases the extent of 
liability exposure, shifts the focus from making the victim whole 
to punishing the wrongdoer, and requires a self-dealing trustee 
to disgorge any profit that the trustee may have made.192 The 
increased exposure to liability acts as a monitoring substitute.193 
Viewed with this purpose in mind, the extent of the lack of 
monitoring should dictate the strictness of the fiduciary duty.194 
                                            
 186. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 
U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1686 (1990). 
 187. See Alexander, supra note 29, at 77576 (comparing the weaker good-faith 
obligation in the contract setting to a fiduciarys higher duty of loyalty, noting that [t]he 
picture that emerges from the case law is that in contractual relationships the duty is 
dont screw the other side, but with regard to fiduciary relationships the demand to the 
fiduciary is protect your beneficiary, not yourself). 
 188. Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, 
and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 90809. 
 189. See Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2761 n.1, 277071 (2006) (arguing that the best way to reduce 
agency costs is to employ a monitoring mechanism for the agencys actions). 
 190. Id. at 2768. 
 191. See supra notes 3841 and accompanying text. 
 192. Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorneys Place in the Family of Fiduciary 
Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 18 (2001); see also Cooter & Freedman, supra note 13, at 
107071 (discussing no further inquiry rules punishment for disloyalty); Sitkoff, supra 
note 30, at 57374 (discussing the no further inquiry rules disgorgement remedy). 
 193. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 13, at 105153, 1069. 
 194. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 43234 (chronicling the differences 
across the many kinds of [fiduciary] endeavors by examining various examples). 
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Trustees generally hold the highest duty because they are not 
supervised by courts, and while they can be monitored by the 
beneficiaries, the beneficiaries are often young, incapacitated, or 
otherwise unsophisticated, and their source of information is the 
trustee.195 By contrast, business entity fiduciaries are subject to 
more scrutiny. If the entity is publicly traded, they are subject to 
government oversight; and if a private entity, it is likely that the 
beneficiaries to the fiduciary relationship are involved directly with 
the business.196 
Another difference is that, in the corporate fiduciary 
setting, conflicting personal interests are unavoidable because 
the business fiduciary will generally have a larger personal 
stake than the trustee, either because the fiduciarys role is 
full-time employment, or because the fiduciary is personally 
invested in the enterprise.197 A trustee, on the other hand, 
generally is not a full-time position, and the trustee generally 
does not have a financial stake in the trust.198 The introduction 
of personal interests in the business fiduciary setting justifies 
the lessening of the duty in part because the fiduciary should 
have the right to protect his or her own stake in the 
enterprise, and in part because the fiduciarys personal stake 
will cause the fiduciary to exercise care in management and 
thus provide some protection to the beneficiarys interest, a 
manifestation of the rising tide lifts all boats aphorism. 
Also, the trustees fees are usually fixed,199 in contrast to 
the business fiduciary (who is likely to receive incentive 
compensation), so the business fiduciary has more incentive to 
increase the value of the asset.200 
                                            
 195. CARYL A. YZENBAARD, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 481, at 21114, 238 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing the importance of 
the high standards for fiduciaries in relationships such as guardianships and conservatorships). 
 196. THOMAS LEE HAZAN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.1[2] (6th ed. 2009); see 
also JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZAN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW § 14.15 (3d ed. 2011) 
(noting an emergence of partnership-like fiduciary obligations running between the 
participants in close corporations). 
 197. See Dickerson, supra note 69, at 118. 
 198. Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 997, 1024 (1981); see also AMY MORRIS HESS, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & 
GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1, at 11 (3d ed. 2007) (noting 
that it is only in rare cases that the beneficiary is allowed to enjoy the trust property). However, 
it is not uncommon for a beneficiary of the trust to also serve as trustee, particularly in family 
settings. Langbein, supra note 175, at 938. That situation offers its own complications. 
 199. MARY F. RADFORD, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW 
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 975, at 5 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that forty-eight state compensation 
statutes provide for trust fee-fixing). 
 200. See 1 RADIN, supra note 66, at 321 (Stock options provide a frequent form of 
director and officer compensation.). 
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Other contrasts between the trust beneficiary and the 
protected party in a business entity include the likelihood that a 
business investor is diversified and can exit the relationship 
easily,201 whereas a trust beneficiarys interest in the trust is 
more likely to be a greater percentage of his or her wealth and 
more difficult (if not impossible) to reinvest if unhappy with the 
trustees performance.202 The number of potential enforcers of the 
duties also affects the level of required duty in the trust and 
business contexts. In a publicly held corporation, shareholders 
are so numerous and their percentage holdings are generally so 
insignificant that they lack the power and the incentive to 
litigate breaches of duty.203 This may be one explanation why the 
movement in the law of business entities is to dilute fiduciary 
duty, even in light of the recent corporate scandals.204 On the 
other hand, where there are only a few beneficiaries or a few 
shareholders, in the case of a closely held corporation, the stakes 
are higher and the relationships more likely to be personal, 
increasing the likelihood that the beneficiaries would be 
motivated to litigate.205 
If the difference in level of duty between a trustee and a 
business fiduciary is attributable only to a concern about freedom 
of contract and to the lower need for fiduciary penalties to control 
the behavior of business fiduciaries, then simply imposing the 
higher duty of trustee on the dual-purpose fiduciary would 
appear to be the obvious answer. However, the lesser duty of the 
business fiduciary plays an important role in enhancing the 
fiduciarys performance. 
An overly strict enforcement of the fiduciary duty in the 
business setting may lead to over-cautious behavior, desirable in 
a trust setting but undesirable in a business setting where risks 
are necessary for long-term success of an enterprise. The drafters 
of the Model Business Corporation Act supported inclusion of 
exculpatory provisions so that directors would not be 
                                            
 201. ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2006). 
 202. See Sitkoff, supra note 30, at 57375. 
 203. See Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 679 (noting that the primary beneficiary of 
shareholder actions is often the lawyers, due to shareholders little incentive to reckon 
the costs and benefits of litigation). 
 204. John A. Pearce & Ilya A. Lipin, The Duties of Directors and Officers Within the 
Fuzzy Zone of Insolvency, AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 361, 374 (2011) ([R]ulings from 
Delaware, California, and Louisiana courts suggest a legal trend of limiting and 
eliminating the directors and officers duties to creditors while in the zone of 
insolvency.). 
 205. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 679. 
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discouraged from fully and freely carrying out their duties, 
including responsible entrepreneurial risk-taking.206 A trustees 
responsibility regarding investment of the assets is tilted toward 
conservation of the assets.207 The duty includes the duty to 
diversify,208 in order to reduce the beneficiarys risk and perhaps 
in response to the concern that the trust assets may represent all 
or a significant portion of the beneficiarys assets. Beyond 
diversification, the trustee is now allowed to take more risks 
than previously allowed, but only because some risk is now 
considered necessary to preserve value.209 The trustee is expected 
to follow modern portfolio theory, investing with an eye to the 
entire return.210 Under this approach, the trustee must take on 
some risk in order to keep the core value of the trust in pace with 
inflation, but must exercise caution in light of the beneficiaries 
circumstances.211 
This conservative approach would be disastrous in most 
business settings. The business manager must prudently protect 
capital sufficient for the businesss needs, but the primary concern 
must be the business rather than the investment of the owners and 
the owners individual risk tolerance. The justification behind the 
business judgment rule is that courts are not in a position to assess 
the reasonableness of a business decision,212 whereas courts are 
comfortable evaluating a trustees performance of the more 
straightforward task of maintaining a portfolios value.213 If a 
business manager were subject to the broad and indefinite fiduciary 
                                            
 206. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) & cmt. 2.I (2010); see also Fairfax, supra 
note 86, at 449 ([S]cholars claim that too much personal liability is quite simply bad for 
business because it undermines the innovation necessary for businesses to thrive.). 
 207. Uniform Prudent Investor Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://www.nccusl.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Prudent%20Investor%20Act (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) (requiring investors to invest as a prudent investor would invest and 
noting that a reasonable approach to investment of trust assets is one that preserv[es] 
trust assets). 
 208. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3, 7B U.L.A. 29 (2006); see supra notes 6163 
and accompanying text. 
 209. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2, 7B U.L.A. 20 (2006) (providing a series of 
factors that should weigh in a trustees investment decisions as part of an overall 
investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust). 
 210. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT prefatory note, 7B U.L.A. 3 (2006); see also 
JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY 1718 (2d ed. 
1998) (explaining that, under modern portfolio theory, risk and return are balanced to 
compensate investors appropriately for accepting greater risks through the promise of 
higher returns). 
 211. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2, 7B U.L.A. 20 (2006); Uniform Prudent 
Investor Act Summary, supra note 207. 
 212. 1 RADIN, supra note 66, at 35. 
 213. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust 
Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J.L. & ECON. 681, 68687 (2007). 
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duties of a trustee, he would react by acting conservatively in order 
to best avoid liability. But that conservative behavior can ultimately 
damage the growth and survival of the enterprise. 
Another factor to consider is that within the realm of 
business fiduciaries, there is a broad range of interests. A 
shareholder in a large publicly traded corporation has different 
concerns than the limited partners in a family-owned limited 
liability company, even though as noted above, the fiduciary 
duties of the managers of such enterprises do not vary 
significantly.214 
There are some settings, however, where fiduciaries of close 
corporations have been held to standards closer to those of 
trustee. The classic case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.215 
illustrates the inhibiting nature of enforcing a strict fiduciary 
duty in a close corporation. In Donahue, a minority shareholder 
complained when the company redeemed shares of Harry Rodd, 
its retiring president, director, and former controlling 
shareholder.216 The redemption resulted in Rodds children 
controlling the company.217 The minority shareholder argued that 
she should have had an equivalent opportunity to redeem her 
shares.218 The court held that the majority shareholders owed a 
duty of utmost good faith and loyalty to the minority 
shareholders.219 The higher standard of Donahue has been diluted 
in ensuing years, however, replacing the heightened fiduciary 
duty with the tort of freeze-out and the shareholder oppression 
doctrine.220 A freeze-out theory requires proof that the majority 
shareholder intentionally set out to deprive the minority of all 
benefits of stock ownership.221 Shareholder oppression is 
primarily statutory and provides causes of action to minority 
shareholders against majority owners who engage in fraudulent, 
illegal, or oppressive conduct.222 
                                            
 214. See supra Part II.E (discussing the gap between the trustee fiduciary duties and 
the business fiduciary duties). 
 215. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
 216. Id. at 50810. 
 217. Id. at 510. 
 218. Id. at 511. 
 219. Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 220. Mitchell, supra note 186, at 171417. 
 221. Id. at 1720; see also, e.g., Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 78 (1st Cir. 
1986) (setting forth the test minority shareholders must meet to establish a freeze-out 
claim). 
 222. Mitchell, supra note 186, at 1716 n.168; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-940(a)(1) 
(2003); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASSNS § 3-413(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2007); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 302A.751 subdiv.1 (b)(2) (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-501(1)(a) (2009); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(c) (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300(2)(ii) (2006). 
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Commentators have lamented the application of the 
contractarian approach of minimal, waivable duties to the closely 
held organization, pointing out that the situations of vulnerable 
owners in those organizations are more akin to trust 
beneficiaries than shareholders of public corporations.223 In this 
context, minority owners have a much larger personal stake in 
the enterprise and will often have little real bargaining power in 
the initial creation of waivers.224 The variations in the business 
fiduciary roles further demonstrate the tension between the 
complete abrogation of duties under the assumption of freedom of 
contract and the need to retain flexibility of the managers to 
make key business decisions. It also illustrates that courts have 
been willing to fashion rules to fit the special circumstances of a 
small business, thus setting precedent to develop a unique 
approach to the dual-role fiduciary. 
III. WHEN ONE PERSON ACTS IN TWO FIDUCIARY CAPACITIES 
 The following cases illustrate the various problems 
encountered in cases of a dual fiduciary: the dangers to a 
beneficiary when the fiduciary tries to rely on the more lax set of 
duties; the difficult choices a fiduciary must make to avoid 
liability, to the detriment of the business enterprise; and the 
confusion of courts when evaluating the conduct of dual 
fiduciaries. Not surprisingly, the level of the fiduciarys 
culpability and bad faith seems to affect the standard applied by 
the court, but the holdings often do not present adequate rules 
for future cases where the fiduciarys conduct is more or less 
egregious. Several of the cases, however, point the way to 
development of a new approach that recognizes the dual fiduciary 
as a distinct category and balances the interests of the 
beneficiaries and the business entity. 
A. The Estate of Harry Winston 
Harry Winstons estate plan is an archetypal illustration of 
how the same conduct by a fiduciary can be analyzed very 
differently depending on the type of fiduciary involved. The case 
demonstrates the dangers of the current approach defining the two 
                                            
 223. See Dibadj, supra note 8, at 461, 46569, 474. 
 224. Id. at 46768. For example, the minority stakeholders may have received their 
shares as gifts. It is not uncommon for a parent to form an LLC, reducing the duties as 
much as statutorily possible, retain management control, and gift the equity interests to 
children. This can be particularly risky if the parent then turns management power over 
to only one of the children. 
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fiduciary roles separately. The categorization of a fiduciary as one or 
another type allows a dual fiduciary to use the lower set of duties to 
excuse favoring his own interests over the trust beneficiarys. 
Harry Winston was the internationally famous jeweler known 
for such exploits as donating the Hope Diamond to the Smithsonian 
(mailing it via registered mail).225 He also labored to smuggle 
diamonds out of Europe just after the outbreak of World War II, his 
wife helping to keep them out of the hands of the Nazis by putting 
diamonds in her girdle.226 When it came time to prepare his estate 
plan in 1968, Harrys family consisted of his wife, Edna, and his two 
sons, Ronald and Bruce, both young adults at the time.227 The 1968 
Will treated Bruce and Ronald equally, giving each of them 
$600,000 outright upon his death.228 The Will further provided that 
one-half of his common stock in Harry Winston, Inc. (HWI) would 
be converted to cumulative, nonvoting preferred shares and given to 
the Harry Winston Foundation, Inc.229 The remaining one-half of the 
common shares would be placed in trust for Edna, to the extent 
such a gift would qualify for the then-existing marital deduction,230 
and upon Ednas death the remainder of such trust was subject to 
Ednas general power of appointment,231 and in default of Edna 
exercising her power of appointment, the remainder would be 
distributed to Harrys then-living issue.232 The executors and 
trustees named in the Will were Gerald Schultz, a friend and 
business associate, William Rogers, a friend and attorney, and 
Bankers Trust Company.233 Ronald was named as an alternate to 
either Mr. Schultz or Mr. Rogers.234  
In 1971, Harry executed a First Codicil, changing the 
disposition of the remainder of Ednas trust.235 Under the 1968 
                                            
 225. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 49. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See Will of Harry Winston 13 (June 27, 1968) (on file with Houston Law Review). 
 228. Id. at 23. 
 229. Id. at 8, 11. 
 230. Id. at 810. At the time, this equaled 50% of the gross estate. 
 231. Id. at 10 ([A]s she may appoint by a will, specifically referring to and exercising 
this power of appointment, in favor of her estate, her creditors, or the creditors of her 
estate, or any other appointee or appointees, in further trust or otherwise.). A general 
power of appointment grants a person the right to direct distribution of certain property 
to anyone, including himself or herself. The Internal Revenue Code defines a general 
power of appointment as a power which is exercisable in favor of the [donee], his estate, 
his creditors or the creditors of his estate. I.R.C § 2041(b) (2006). 
 232. Will of Harry Winston, supra note 227, at 10. 
 233. Id. at 12. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See generally First Codicil to Will of Harry Winston (Feb. 19, 1971) [hereinafter 
First Codicil] (on file with Houston Law Review). 
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Will, when Edna died, Bruce and Ronald (assuming they were 
both living at Ednas death) would have received one-half of 
Ednas trust, which would have consisted of all of the common 
voting stock of Harry Winston, Inc. outright.236 The 1971 Codicil 
changed that to put Bruces share in trust.237 Every five years 
following Ednas death, Bruce would receive one-fifth of the trust 
principal outright, until the last payment upon the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of Ednas death.238 A Second Codicil was signed by 
Harry later in 1971, making changes relating to tax issues, and 
in 1972 a Third Codicil was signed, disposing of his residence and 
the contents of the home.239 
In 1975, Harry revised his Will one last time before his 
death.240 In this codicil, he gave Ronald the final say in management 
of the company by replacing William Rogers with Ronald as one of 
the three executors and trustees, and further providing that: 
If at any time a dispute shall arise in respect of the 
administration of any trust created by this Will, I direct my 
trustees to take such action with respect to the matter in 
dispute as my son, RONALD WINSTON, while serving as 
trustee hereunder, shall determine; and in taking such 
action, I direct that all my other trustees shall be entirely 
free, as individuals and fiduciaries hereunder, from all 
responsibility or liability for any losses sustained by the 
trust as a consequence thereof.241 
The changes in his estate plan reflected Harry Winstons 
perception of his sons abilities and interests. Harry Winston 
supposedly once told his sister-in-law, Lillian Winston, I have two 
sons[,] . . . [o]ne is a genius and one is a moron.242 Ronald Winston 
graduated from Harvard and worked in rocket science for a time243 
before joining the family business in his late 20s, at the request of 
his father.244 Bruce, who is four years younger than his brother, 
                                            
 236. Will of Harry Winston, supra note 227, at 89. 
 237. First Codicil, supra note 235, at 34. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Second Codicil to Will of Harry Winston 13 (Apr. 16, 1971) (on file with 
Houston Law Review); Third Codicil to Will of Harry Winston 14 (Dec. 1, 1972) (on file 
with Houston Law Review). 
 240. Fourth Codicil to Will of Harry Winston (Feb. 3, 1975) (on file with Houston 
Law Review). 
 241. Id. at 12. 
 242. Wadler, supra note 2. 
 243. The New York Times article states that his rocket propulsion studies were at 
MIT. Id. But in the New York Magazine article, Nina Burleigh states that the rocket 
studies were at NYU. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 48. 
 244. Wadler, supra note 2. 
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dropped out of college to lead a life of relative leisure,245 although 
according to his lawyer, he was active in the business in the 1960s 
and early 1970s.246 Bruce has been described as notoriously laid-
back and a very sweet guy,247 while Ronald is described as a 
workaholic, very secretive, and prone to long-range thinking.248 
The Winston family therefore presented a classic paradigm: 
a family-owned business, with one driven, hardworking child 
interested in carrying on the business and another child who is 
more of a free spirit, not interested in continuing the familys 
business legacy but who remains in the parents good graces. 
Harry Winstons solution to this estate planning dilemma was 
also standard: split the estate equally but put the hardworking 
child in charge.249 
Harry Winston died in 1978, and until Ednas death in 1986, 
Ronald managed the business with no apparent family dissension.250 
Edna became incapacitated shortly after Harrys death, and her 
sons moved her to Florida in 1979 and were appointed co-guardians 
for her by a Florida court.251 In 1983, Bruce and Ronald as co-
guardians petitioned the court for approval to transfer all of Ednas 
separate assets into the trust set up for her benefit under Harrys 
Will.252 Ronald asserted that the reason for the transfer was to save 
on taxes in Ednas estate, but a very significant effect of the 
requested transfer fell on Bruce.253 Under Ednas Will, Bruce was 
entitled to receive one-half of her assets outright at her death.254 
However, his share of the trust set up under Harrys Will was to be 
held in trust for up to twenty-five years following Ednas death.255 
The transfer therefore meant that Bruces share of his mothers 
assets was moved to his brothers control as his trustee.256 
Apparently, Bruce did not understand this at the time, and in 1991, 
                                            
 245. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 49. 
 246. Wadler, supra note 2. 
 247. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 49. 
 248. Id. at 4849. 
 249. See Fox, supra note 10, at 9-11 to -12, -23 (describing placing the family 
business in a trust and also describing various forms of passing down a business, giving 
as examples: (1) putting one child in control of Forbes Magazine by leaving 51% to the 
oldest son Steve, and leaving the remainder of interests to the other four children; (2) and 
the Beretta family gun manufacturing business). 
 250. Michael A. Riccardi, Deal Closes 12-Year Battle for Jewelers Estate, N.Y. L.J., 
July 25, 2000, at 1, 8. 
 251. Winston v. Winston, 684 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 31617. 
 254. Id. at 316. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
Do Not Delete  4/29/2012 5:25 PM 
270 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [49:2 
after Ednas death, Bruce brought suit in Florida to undo the 
transfer, claiming that Ronald had committed fraud.257 The court of 
appeals, however, found insufficient evidence of fraud, in light of the 
fact that the Wills of his parents and the opportunity for 
independent counsel were available to Bruce, and it refused to 
invalidate the transaction.258 
After Harrys death, the executors carried out the 
instructions of his Will and reorganized HWI, creating 100 
shares of preferred stock and 100 shares of voting common 
stock.259 Ninety-five shares of preferred were distributed to the 
Harry Winston Research Foundation, which in turn donated 
the shares to the Genetic Research Trust, an entity created 
and allegedly controlled by Ronald.260 Ninety shares of 
common stock were placed in the trust for Edna, and the 
remaining shares were redeemed to pay expenses.261 The 
preferred stock [was] entitled to a guaranteed annual 
dividend of . . . $332,500.262 Payment of this dividend was at 
the discretion of HWI management, but the common stock 
could not receive a dividend until all accrued but unpaid 
dividends owed on the preferred were paid.263 
Until Ednas death in 1986, the ratio of preferred to 
common stock remained constantninety-five shares of 
preferred to ninety shares of common, so the equity position of 
the two types of stock was essentially the same. However, after 
Ednas death, the trust started redeeming common shares to 
pay Ednas estate taxes and expenses.264 By 1990, the trust 
                                            
 257. Id. at 317. 
 258. See id. at 320 (By our reversal, we neither condone nor condemn Ronalds 
actions. Ronald urges us to exonerate him and find no fraud existed as a matter of law, 
but it is unnecessary for the resolution of this appeal to reweigh the evidence to determine 
whether Ronald acted as the concerned, dutiful son and brother with intent to maximize 
the tax benefits for both his brother and himself or as a knave and scoundrel with intent 
to dupe Bruce and maximize his parents legacies for himself. We reverse because, as a 
matter of law, no extrinsic fraud has been demonstrated . . . .). The Florida litigation 
resulted in discipline by the Florida Bar of one of Bruces lawyers, Edward H. Wohl, for 
his participation in paying a consulting fee to a former employee of the Winston family 
business who was a fact witness in the proceeding. Florida Bar v. Wohl, 842 So. 2d 811, 
814 (Fla. 2003). David Boies and Bob Silver were the trial attorneys in the Florida 
litigation but only Mr. Wohl was a member of the Florida Bar and subject to discipline 
there. See id. at 81213. 
 259. In re Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1001 (Sur. Ct.), affd 636 N.Y.S.2d 635 (App. 
Div. 1995). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
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owned only seventeen shares of stock, dropping the equity 
position of the common from 49% (90/185) to 15% (17/112).265 
The corporation had never paid dividends to the common 
shareholders.266 Ronald argued that the lack of dividends was 
due to a lack of profitability of the company, and in any event 
dividends were impossible, because the accrued but unpaid 
dividends owed to the preferred stock would have to be paid 
first, and then any further dividend paid would have to pay a 
proportionate share to the preferred shares.267 Bruce was 
therefore receiving no income from his ownership in the 
company.268 Bruce had been employed by the company during 
Ednas lifetime and had been receiving a salary, but Ronald 
had subsequently fired him.269 Ronald, however, was being paid 
to run the company; his compensation increased from $248,000 
in 1979 to $1,138,000 in 1990.270 
Ronald then decided, over the objections of Bruce and the 
other trustees, to distribute the stock from Ednas trust as 
follows: Ronald received half the stock, Bruce received 10% of 
the stock outright (reflecting his right to a one-fifth 
distribution) and the remaining 40% went to the trust for 
Bruces benefit.271 Ronald then had HWI and Bruces total 
interest appraised, using a liquidation value as opposed to the 
value if the company was sold as an ongoing business, and 
asked for court approval of a sale to him of all of Bruces 
interests for $4.5 million.272 The price was based on the 
appraisals, but the appraisal of Bruces one-half interest set 
the value of that interest at just a little more than a third of 
the total liquidation value.273 Presumably Bruces interest was 
discounted for marketability and control limitations. The steps 
taken by Ronald had therefore made Bruces holdings 
worthless as long as he or the trust owned them, and thus 
deeply discounted the value to Ronald of his holdings in the 
event of a buyout.274 
                                            
 265. Id. at 100102. 
 266. Id. at 1002. 
 267. Id. at 100203. 
 268. Id. at 1003. 
 269. Id. at 100607. 
 270. Id. at 1002. 
 271. Id. at 1001. 
 272. Id. at 1002. 
 273. See id. (describing how the appraiser valued the total stock at $12 million, but 
valued Bruces one-half share at $4.5 million). 
 274. Id. at 1003. 
Do Not Delete  4/29/2012 5:25 PM 
272 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [49:2 
This scenario was a classic squeeze-out.275 A squeeze-out 
usually occurs in a closely held corporation where the 
shareholders work for the company and no dividends are paid.276 
The majority shareholder can remove a minority shareholder 
from the board, terminate the minority shareholders 
employment with the company, and continue the existing 
practice of not paying dividends, thus cutting off the minority 
shareholders income from the company.277 In this typical 
scenario, the terminated minority shareholder can get relief, 
depending on the particular facts of the case and the approach 
taken by the court, and such relief is usually in the form of a 
cash-out at fair market value of the minority shareholders 
interest in the company.278 Here, Ronald held only 50% of the 
shares, but his voting power over the trusts shares gave him the 
same power to freeze out Bruce as the extra 1% ownership would 
have given.279 There is a recognized fiduciary duty owed by a 
majority shareholder to a minority shareholder that was not 
applicable here because the facts were slightly different, but that 
fiduciary duty presents another model of analysis in reviewing 
the behavior of someone in Ronalds position.280 
Both Bruce and the other trustees objected to Ronalds 
actions.281 The trustees objected to the distribution of stock to 
Ronald and Bruce from Ednas marital trust, concerned that 
                                            
 275. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and Fair Value: Of Discounts, 
Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DUKE L.J. 293, 301 (2004) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that a squeeze-out occurs when a 
majority shareholder is able to act against the minority shareholders interests). 
 276. See id. at 30002. 
 277. See CLARK, supra note 95, § 12.4 (1986); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-Outs and 
Freeze-Outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 498 (1995) (In a 
squeeze-out, the majority shareholders use their control to deprive the minority of any 
managerial control over, and, of more practical significance, any economic return from, the 
corporation.); Moll, supra note 275, at 302; Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statues: 
Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Business, 66 
U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 885 (1995) (describing a classic exclusion of a minority shareholder); see 
also Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (summarizing methods of 
abuse by majority shareholders); Sandra K. Miller, A Note on the Definition of Oppressive 
Conduct by Majority Shareholders: How Can the Reasonable Expectation Standard Be 
Reasonably Applied in Pennsylvania?, 12 J.L. & COM. 51, 8182 (1992) (listing certain acts that 
show the existence of oppressive conduct).  
 278. Oesterle, supra note 277, at 88586. 
 279. In re Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1000 (explaining that Ronald could overrule the 
majority decision of the trustees). 
 280. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 51517 (Mass. 1975); see 
Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 175, 177 (2004) (noting two legal principles which have supported the application of 
fiduciary duties in the shareholder context). 
 281. In re Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1001. 
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there would not be sufficient assets available to pay remaining 
fees and expenses in settling the Edna Trust.282 Bruce objected to 
the sale of his interest to Ronald based on the liquidation value 
appraisal.283 Both Bruces appraiser and the courts appraiser 
found that the value based on a sale was at least five times 
higher than a liquidation value and that therefore a liquidation 
value was an inappropriate benchmark.284 The question before 
the court was whether Ronalds actions were such an abuse of 
fiduciary duty that he should lose his veto power granted to him 
in his fathers Will.285 
Ronald defended his actions on the grounds that his fathers 
primary objective was preserving the company and Ronalds 
continuing management of it, and that everything he had done 
was either necessary to carry out this purpose or a consequence 
foreseeable by Harry.286 The reviewing court found, however, that 
while it agreed that Harry wanted Ronald to continue at the 
helm of the business, 
for Ronald to conclude from these facts that Harry intended 
to vest absolute control of the family enterprise in him for 
the balance of his career and to subordinate Bruces 
inheritance to this alleged dominant and paramount 
intention, even at the expense of depriving Bruce of the 
benefit and value of his equal share of the family fortune, 
is simply not supported by a reasonable construction and 
interpretation of the Will.287 
The court went on to note that if Harry intended to 
disinherit Bruce, there were easier ways of doing it.288 The court 
further concluded that the combination of the creation of 
preferred stock that was donated to the Foundation (which was 
according to the court, a brilliant estate planning device289) and 
the redemption of a large portion of the common stock to pay 
Ednas estate taxes (perhaps not so brilliant290) so decimated 
                                            
 282. Id. The trustees claimed that the distribution of stock was self-motivated and an 
abuse of Ronalds veto power. Id. 
 283. Id. at 1002. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 1003. 
 286. Id. at 100405. 
 287. Id. at 1005. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 1007. 
 290. Presumably, the trustees could have foreseen the estate tax liability but no 
steps seem to have been taken to ameliorate the effects of such a large redemption, such 
as paying the tax over an extended period of time under section 6166 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 6166 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). Without further facts, it is 
impossible to tell whether the shrinking of the common stock down to 15% of the company 
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Bruces one-half interest in the common stock that the only way 
he could benefit from ownership was a sale of the business at its 
going-concern value, and that the trust had to be distributed in a 
manner consistent with Harrys clear intent that Ronald and 
Bruce benefit equally.291 The court ordered the stock returned to 
the Edna Trust and removed Ronalds veto power, holding that 
Ronald had an irreconcilable conflict because of his status as 
trustee, beneficiary, officer, and director of the corporations; 
trustee of the Genetic Research Trust; and owner of the preferred 
shares.292 Ultimately, the case between the brothers was resolved 
when, in 2000, the court approved sale of Bruces interests to 
Ronald and a group of investors for $54.1 million.293 
Ronalds extreme actions caused the court to dismantle the 
management scheme that Harry Winston had created. Ronald 
excused the steps he took, which made Bruces present interests 
in the company virtually worthless, on the grounds that they 
were consistent with a corporate fiduciarys duties. However, he 
arguably breached even those lower duties, which acknowledge a 
controlling partys duty to minority owners. The courts holding, 
however, relied on Ronalds duties as trustee.294 It reasoned that 
the various roles Ronald held created an irreconcilable conflict, 
implying that Harry Winstons plan was structurally flawed and 
would have failed even if Ronald had been more protective of 
Bruces interests.295 Arguably, Ronalds limitation of Bruces 
interest pushed the court to emphasize the stricter role, but the 
two separate definitions of the fiduciary roles can cause courts to 
question whether it is ever permissible to serve as both. Family 
business owners in Harry Winstons position commonly desire 
this structure of family ownership and control, so a new category 
that protects both beneficiaries and the business entity is 
necessary. 
B. Other Cases 
The case of Rosencrans v. Fry presents an interesting 
contrast to Estate of Winston. In Rosencrans, the testator owned 
                                            
value (which definitely hurt Bruce but perhaps helped Ronald) could have been avoided or 
reduced. 
 291. In re Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1007. 
 292. Id. at 1008. 
 293. Riccardi, supra note 250, at 1, 8. Note that Ronald had initially petitioned the 
court in the early 1990s to purchase Bruces interest for $4.5 million. In re Winston, 631 
N.Y.S.2d at 1002. 
 294. In re Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1008. 
 295. Id. 
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close to 50% of a closely held company, with the remaining 
interests held by approximately fifty investors.296 The testators 
Will left his stock in the company in trust, naming as co-trustees 
his wife and William Fry, a long-term employee who had been 
running the company since the testator had become less 
involved.297 The testators wife was the income beneficiary of the 
trust, with the remainder of the trust to go to two nephews at her 
death.298 The Will also gave to my friend, William M. Fry, the 
right to purchase any or all of said stock at its par value of $25.00 
per share.299 Fry was elected president of the company, as 
requested in the Will, and also served on the board of directors.300 
The book value of the shares at the time the Will was signed was 
over $50 a share.301 The testator died in 1944, and in 1946, Mr. 
Fry tried to exercise the option to buy the shares, but the widow 
became so upset he dropped the issue.302 In 1949, he stated his 
intention to exercise the option, and the widow took the position 
that he could not exercise the option during her lifetime.303 
Litigation ensued, and after a judge had entered an oral 
determination in favor of Mr. Frys right to purchase the shares, 
but before a written judgment was entered, the widow and the 
two nephews, who were on the board of directors, voted large 
cash dividends and stock dividends of 50% and 300% be paid to 
existing shareholders.304 Mr. Fry and the other director voted 
against the dividends.305 Action on the dividends was enjoined 
and ultimately invalidated.306 Once the widow lost on the 
question of the enforceability of the option, she asserted a claim 
that Mr. Fry had breached his fiduciary duty as trustee, claiming 
that he should have voted for larger dividends, in the best 
interest of the income beneficiary, and that his option price 
should be increased to reflect the improperly undistributed 
                                            
 296. Rosencrans v. Fry, 91 A.2d 162, 166 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952), affd 95 
A.2d 905 (N.J. 1953). 
 297. Id. at 163, 167. 
 298. Id. at 163. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 166. 
 301. Id. at 167. 
 302. Id. at 16364, 168. 
 303. Id. at 164. 
 304. Id. at 16465. The stock dividends were issued because the widow believed that 
Mr. Frys option to purchase would extend only to the original shares and not the shares 
issued pursuant to the stock dividend, which the court in dicta indicated was incorrect. Id. 
at 169. 
 305. Id. at 164. 
 306. Id. at 165. 
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earnings.307 The courts response to this claim was unusually 
pragmatic. It noted that Fry was put by the testator in the 
dueling positions of trustee holding stock, and director and 
president of the company.308 In addition [t]o these potentially 
divergent obligations, the testator added the complicating factor 
of an option in Fry to purchase at a fixed price, unhinged to the 
true worth of the shares.309 The court found it relevant that the 
testator had created the conflict and apparently had confidence 
that Fry would act fairly in his dual fiduciary roles, even in light 
of the personal interest of the option added in.310 Also important 
to the court was the fact that the widow was also a co-trustee and 
on the board, as well as a beneficiary of the trust, and approved 
all actions taken that she was now claiming were a breach of 
Frys fiduciary duty.311 The pattern of retaining earnings rather 
than distributing all earnings as dividends was also not one of 
Frys creations; it had begun during the testators lifetime, and 
the testator had approved of the expansion program carried out 
after his death that required retention of earnings.312 
What is most significant about the Rosencrans decision is 
the courts resolution of the conflict between the fiduciary duty of 
trustee and corporate manager. It noted that a trustee holding 
stock must vote such stock in a way to promote the beneficiaries 
best interests, but this principle does not embrace a duty to 
advance the interest of a beneficiary at the expense of the 
corporation and other outstanding stockholders interests.313 In a 
case of a dual fiduciary acting reasonably, the court implicitly 
recognized a hybrid set of duties. 
In Bartlett v. Dumaine, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
analyzed the duties of trustees in a setting very similar to the 
Winston Trust, but with very different results. In that case, 
Frederic Dumaine Sr. created the familys business, the 
Amoskeag Company, and during his lifetime created the 
Dumaines Trust for the benefit of his children and 
grandchildren.314 In addition to the Dumaines Trust, Frederic 
Dumaine Sr. also established the Dexter Trust, which was for the 
benefit of his son Buck for life, with the remainder to be 
                                            
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 166. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 167. 
 311. Id. at 16667. 
 312. Id. at 167. 
 313. Id. at 16768. 
 314. Bartlett v. Dumaine, 523 A.2d 1, 5 (N.H. 1986). 
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distributed to the Dumaines Trust upon the death of the survivor 
of Buck and his father.315 The trusts were funded primarily with 
company stock, and according to the court, the elder Dumaine 
and his son Buck dominated the company and the trusts, and 
persons on the payroll of the company also generally managed 
the trust.316 After the death of the father, several of Bucks 
siblings became unsatisfied with their lack of control (and their 
brothers exclusive control) over the family trusts and the 
company, and they sought an accounting of the Dexter Trust, on 
the theory that, as beneficiaries of the Dumaines Trust, which in 
turn was the remainder beneficiary of the Dexter Trust, they had 
a right to know the activity in the Dexter Trust.317 In addition, 
they alleged various breaches of fiduciary duty on the part of 
trustees who also benefited as employees of the company.318 
There were two major differences between the Dumaine 
trusts and the Winston Trust. First, the trusts were set up 
during the elder Dumaines lifetime, rather than at his death, as 
Harry Winston had done.319 This difference is significant because 
the court in Dumaine focused on how the elder Dumaine ran the 
trust and the company as an integrated enterprise,320 indicating 
that the settlor intended the trustees of Dumaines, within their 
discretion, to take business risks with trust funds in concert with 
the Amoskeag Company,321 and that the prudent person 
                                            
 315. Id. In addition to the Dumaines Trust and the Dexter Trust, there were seven 
satellite trusts, one for each of Mr. Dumaines seven children. Each child was the income 
beneficiary of a satellite trust, with the remainder of the trust paid to the Dumaines Trust 
on the childs death. Id. 
 316. Id. at 56, 13. 
 317. Id. at 6, 14. 
 318. The specific allegations of fiduciary breaches were: (1) a $4 million unsecured 
loan from the trust to one of the companys subsidiaries; (2) the purchase of a yacht from a 
subsidiary by a trustee who was also a company officer, and an interest-free loan from the 
company to the same company officer as well as a very favorable employment contract 
with the officer; (3) payment of over $1 million in management fees from the trust to the 
company; and (4) the conflicts of interest inherent in several trustees also holding 
positions in the company. Id. at 613. 
 319. Id. at 5; cf. Will of Harry Winston, supra note 227, at 811. 
 320. Bartlett, 523 A.2d at 8. The court did not discuss the potential impropriety of 
Mr. Dumaine Sr.s actions with regard to the trust because all beneficial interests were 
held by his children and grandchildren, and yet trust assets seemed available to invest in 
the companys various enterprises. For example, the report of the master presiding over 
the hearing found that the trust had features of both a trust and a corporation, and that 
the general intent of the settlor was to give the trustees absolute control of trust property 
and trust business. Id. However, the beneficiaries must have some rights to enforce the 
trustees duties towards them or there is no trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 25 
(1959) (No trust is created unless the settlor manifests an intention to impose enforceable 
duties.). 
 321. Bartlett, 523 A.2d at 8. 
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standard of investment normally imposed on trustees did not 
therefore apply.322 The court, in analyzing the propriety of the 
trustees actions, noted that this was not a normal trust, and 
the conflicts of interest were inherent in the declared scheme of 
the settlor.323 Such inherent conflicts were present in the scheme 
that Harry Winstons estate plan contemplated, but the settlors 
intent to allow such conflicts in Dumaine was ratified by the 
settlors own participation in that scheme during his lifetime.324 
The second difference was that the children in Dumaine 
could not point to specific damages such as those in the Winston 
case.325 The conflicts of interest had not resulted in any 
significant damage; for example, the unsecured loan of $4 million 
made by the trust to a company subsidiary that was in financial 
trouble was in fact repaid.326 This may have contributed to the 
courts remarkably relaxed standard in judging the trustees 
actions.327 
The courts in Rosencrans and Bartlett both acknowledged an 
adjustment in a trustees strict duties to accommodate the business 
entitys interest. In Perry v. Perry, however, another case where the 
trustees alleged breaches caused no great harm, the court applied 
the lower corporate fiduciary standard.328 A grandson of the trustor 
challenged the actions of his uncles as trustees and directors of the 
family company whose stock was owned by the trust.329 The history 
                                            
 322. Id. at 78; see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE 
§ 227(a) (1992) (The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and manage the 
funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution 
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. This standard requires the exercise of 
reasonable care, skill, and caution, and is to be applied to Investments not in isolation but in 
the context of the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy, which should 
incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.) (statement of the more 
modern prudent investor standard); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) (1959) (In 
making investments of trust funds the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in the absence 
of provisions in the terms of the trust or of a statute otherwise providing, to make such 
investments and only such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property 
having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to 
be derived.) (traditional prudent person investment rule). 
 323. Bartlett, 523 A.2d at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 324. Id. at 56. 
 325. Id. at 1516. 
 326. Id. at 7. 
 327. See Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and 
Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2748 & n.104 (2006) (citing Bartlett v. 
Dumaine as support for the point that although there is a general perception that courts 
enforce exculpatory clauses in trust agreements, upon review of the cases courts in fact 
only enforce in limited circumstances showing no unfairness, or in instances where the 
trustee was not a professional). 
 328. Perry v. Perry, 160 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Mass. 1959). 
 329. Id. at 99100. 
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of the trust and company management (including periods 
during the trustors lifetime) was replete with self-dealing and 
conflicts, such as no-interest loans from the company to the 
trusteesdirectors, business dealings between the company and 
businesses owned directly by trusteesdirectors that were very 
profitable to the trusteesdirectors owning the separate business, 
and similar transactions.330 However, the court found that the 
transactions had not caused significant damage to the trust and 
that there was no actual fraud or bad faith.331 The court expressly 
applied the lesser standard of conduct of directors, rather than 
trustees, to the trusteesdirectors, stating that [t]here is no 
basis on the findings for disregarding the corporate entity in 
determining the obligations of the officers of the corporation who 
were also trustees.332 Clearly, if the stricter trustee standards 
had been applied, including the no further inquiry rule, the 
trustees would have been answerable to the complaining 
beneficiary.333 The finding of no significant damage made it easier 
for the court to ignore the standard duties of trustee, just as in 
cases of egregious misconduct the court can easily punish the 
fiduciary by applying the stricter standard.334 The holding in 
Perry leaves beneficiaries of other trusts vulnerable, however, 
because dual fiduciaries will be able to rely on the lower 
standard, and the beneficiaries have lost the presumptions of bad 
faith in any case of trust self-dealing.335 
In Copley v. Copley, the court found no violations of fiduciary 
duty by the trustees, but the holding was based on an exception 
to the trustee standard of no self-dealing rather than an 
                                            
 330. Id. at 10001. In contrast, the grandson borrowed funds from the company and 
was charged 4% annual interest. Id. at 101. 
 331. See id. at 103 (But there is no basis for concluding that there was more than an 
unintentional disregard of the legal requirements or of the necessity, even in a family 
corporation, for formal action to record the proper basis, if it existed, including equitable 
offsets, of action taken in respect of corporate funds and rights.). 
 332. Id. 
 333. See supra notes 3842 and accompanying text (explaining that under the 
stricter no inquiry rule, a trustee is liable for any self-dealing, whether fair or not). 
Another influencing factor may have been the possible characterization of the 
complaining beneficiary as a disgruntled former employee: he had worked at one of his 
uncles separate business but had been fired after twice using a company automobile for 
personal use contrary to orders and proving unsatisfactory in the lumber shed. Perry, 
160 N.E.2d at 102. 
 334. Perry, 160 N.E.2d at 103; see Rosencrans v. Fry, 91 A.2d 162, 16768 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952), affd 95 A.2d 905 (N.J. 1953) (holding that when voting stock, 
fiduciaries are under a duty to vote in such a way as to promote the interests of the 
beneficiaries, but noting that adjustments to the general rule should be made when such 
a vote would be at the expense of the corporation or other shareholders).  
 335. Perry, 160 N.E.2d at 103. 
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application of the less stringent corporate standard.336 There, the 
surviving spouse was trustee of two trusts, a marital trust for her 
sole benefit and a nonmarital trust for the benefit of the trustors 
three children as well as the surviving spouse, who was not the 
mother of the decedents children.337 The trusts were funded 
primarily with stock in the decedents closely held business.338 
The children alleged that the spouse breached her fiduciary duty 
by redeeming stock in the company held by the nonmarital trust 
at a price that was below the stocks actual value.339 The 
redemption was necessary to raise cash to pay the estate tax 
liability.340 After her husbands death, the surviving spouse took 
over management of the company as chair of the board of 
directors and as chief executive officer, so she was serving both 
the corporate and trustee roles, but her actions in redeeming 
the stock were clearly within her trustee duties and the court 
judged them under trustee standards.341 However, the court 
focused on the decedents intent, and the fact that the trust 
allowed the redemption, that such redemption was 
contemplated by the decedent, and that he had created the 
conflict of interest by putting his spouse in position as trustee 
of the nonmarital trust and beneficiary of the marital trust.342 
Based on those facts, the court concluded that the decedent 
had authorized self-dealing, and therefore could not be held to 
the common law prohibition against self-dealing.343 The court 
nevertheless held that the redeemed shares were undervalued, 
and upheld an award adjusting the percentage of shares held 
by the marital and nonmarital trusts.344 However, the breach 
was essentially treated as a breach of the duty of care, 
requiring a corrective remedy but without the necessary 
punitive measures when there is a breach of loyalty.345 What is 
notable about the opinion is the trial courts recognition of the 
                                            
 336. See Copley v. Copley, 178 Cal. Rptr. 842, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that 
the prohibition of self-dealing must give way to directions contained in the trust 
instrument). 
 337. Id. at 84850. 
 338. Id. at 84950. 
 339. Id. at 84748. 
 340. Id. at 853. 
 341. Id. at 864, 866. 
 342. Id. at 853, 857. 
 343. Id. at 862. 
 344. Id. at 864. 
 345. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 13, at 105152, 105960 (discussing how 
sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duties can range from corrective to punitive). For 
example, the court reversed the trial court orders denying fees and costs to the trustees 
and removing the trustees. Copley, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 86673. 
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trustors choices of trustee as an implicit waiver of the self-
dealing prohibition, even while finding that the trustees had 
made an error. 
In Johnson v. Witkowski, the court begins its opinion with a 
telling paragraph: The situation presented by this case brings to 
mind the scenes in old movies in which a ship is sinking and 
someone is heard to yell, Man the lifeboats, women and children 
first! In those movies, the captain usually went down with the 
ship.346 
The case involves complex facts and fiduciaries who were 
clearly abusing their position. The two defendants in this case 
were trustees of trusts holding a majority interest in a closely 
held corporation, Johnson Corrugated, and were also officers, 
directors, and minority shareholders of the corporation.347 The 
defendants started a business that was to supply materials to 
Johnson Corrugateds competitors.348 Financing for the venture 
was secured with personal guaranties from the defendants.349 The 
defendants apparently became concerned about conflicts with 
Johnson Corrugated and brought the company in as a 25% 
shareholder in the new venture.350 When the new company ran 
into financial trouble and needed additional financing, the new 
financial arrangements required an unlimited guaranty from 
Johnson Corrugated.351 Things did not improve, so the defendants 
removed the trust beneficiarys brother from the board of 
directors of Johnson Corrugated and arranged a sale of assets of 
the sinking new company to a newly formed subsidiary of 
Johnson Corrugated.352 The new subsidiary would assume all 
secured liabilities of the failing venture.353 The sale was financed 
by a bank that required Johnson Corrugated to give an unlimited 
guaranty, but this time the defendants did not give personal 
guaranties.354 The defendants thus were released from significant 
liability under the original personal guaranties.355 
The Johnson court had interesting observations about the 
problem of multiple fiduciary roles. Wearing more than one 
                                            
 346. Johnson v. Witkowski, 573 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 516. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. at 51617. 
 351. Id. at 517. 
 352. Id. at 51618. 
 353. Id. at 517. 
 354. Id. at 518. 
 355. Id. at 51718. 
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hathere, at least threerequires a fiduciary to be very nimble 
as well as most prudent. While the fiduciary may purport to wear 
one hat at a particular moment, in truth, all hats are worn 
together at all times.356 In judging the defendants actions, the 
court appeared to find a breach of both their corporate and 
trustee fiduciary duties.357 In responding to a claim of protection 
under the business judgment rule, the court, rather than 
rejecting it as inapplicable where duties of a trustee are owed, 
held that it was inapplicable in the corporate setting where, as 
here, the directors are personally interested in the transaction.358 
The court also notably found that the trust provisions providing 
wide discretion to manage the trust and the corporation, and the 
fact that the trustor obviously contemplates the conflicts present in 
the identity of the directors, officers, trustees, and shareholders, 
were not sufficient to constitute a waiver of self-dealing.359 
The influential Delaware court addressed the dual-acting 
fiduciary in Stegemeier v. Magness.360 The decedents estate 
consisted of undeveloped real property and 83% of a construction 
company that was in financial difficulty.361 The Will provided for 
a gift in trust to the surviving spouse and a residuary trust for 
the benefit of the surviving widow for life, remainder to his 
children (three of whom were not the children of the widow).362 
The widow was also named as co-executor of the estate, together 
with a lawyer, and the decedents brother, who owned the 
remaining 17% of the construction company, was named as 
trustee of the trusts.363 The estate attempted to sell the real 
estate or obtain financing for the construction company to 
develop the real estate but was unsuccessful at both.364 In order 
to get financing to develop the real estate, the widow and the 
trustee individually formed a new, debt-free corporation.365 The 
estate (through the co-executors, the widow and the lawyer) sold 
the land to the new corporation, securing the purchase price with 
                                            
 356. Id. at 518. 
 357. Id. at 521. 
 358. Id. at 522. 
 359. Id. at 52223; see supra note 327 (discussing Professor Melanie Leslies 
observation that trustee exculpatory clauses are only enforced by courts in certain 
categories of cases). 
 360. Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 A.2d 557, 557 (Del. 1999). 
 361. Id. at 55960. 
 362. Id. at 559. 
 363. Id. at 55960. 
 364. Id. at 560. 
 365. Id. 
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a mortgage, and so the land was never placed into the trust.366 
The new corporation developed and sold the property.367 Two of the 
stepdaughters who were remainder beneficiaries sued, claiming 
that the sale of the land to the new corporation was a breach of the 
fiduciary duties of the co-executors and of the trustee.368 The lower 
court held in favor of the defendant fiduciaries, finding that the 
remaindermen did not have standing because any profits from the 
development and sale of the land would have been trust income and 
the widow was the sole income beneficiary.369 Furthermore, the 
lower court held that the fiduciaries did not engage in self-dealing, 
using its interpretation of the corporate, rather than trustee, 
standard of self-dealing.370 The lower court had dismissed the claim 
of self-dealing against the lawyer co-executor, since he had no other 
interest in the transactions, and found that in order for the actions 
of the brother trustee and the widow to be considered self-dealing, 
the relevant factor was not whether they had a personal interest in 
the transaction but whether either of them could have alone caused 
the sale, without consent from anyone else.371 This is a broad 
reading of the corporate standard, which allows self-dealing of a 
director if a majority of disinterested directors approve the 
transaction.372 In this case, it was enough for the trial court that 
there was necessary participation by just one uninterested person, 
the lawyer co-executor.373 
The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court 
and held that the trust standard should apply.374 The only reason 
given by the court for this selection is that the decedent chose the 
form of a trust to hold his assets.375 The court further declined to 
extend the corporate self-dealing standard to the trust context, 
                                            
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. at 55961. 
 369. Id. at 56061. 
 370. Id. at 56162. 
 371. Id. at 56062. 
 372. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011). Section 144 also allows an interested 
transaction if the terms are fair to the corporation, even if a majority of disinterested 
directors had not approved. Id.; see supra notes 9495 and accompanying text (discussing 
the corporate standard). 
 373. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 562. 
 374. Id. at 56263. 
 375. Id. at 563. Interestingly, the court did not consider the inherent conflicts of 
interest created by the decedents choices in his estate plan, a factor considered critical by 
other courts. See Copley v. Copley, 178 Cal. Rptr. 842, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (noting 
that there is an inherent conflict in the trustors appointment of a single individual to 
serve as both administratrix and co-trustee); Bartlett v. Dumaine, 523 A.2d 1, 13 (N.H. 
1986) (finding that an inherent conflict of interest existed in the appointment of an 
employee to both trust and corporate fiduciary positions). 
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despite the various exceptions that have been created under the 
trust standard, because the underlying purpose of the absolute 
prohibitionto prevent fraud that would otherwise be difficult to 
detect,376 and to relieve trustees from any possible conflict 
between duty and self interest,377would not be served by such a 
relaxation of the standard.378 Under trust law principles, it was 
clear that the fiduciaries actions constituted self-dealing, and the 
corporate safe harbor of establishing fairness of the transaction 
was no longer available to them.379 The fiduciaries argued 
necessity as a justification for the sale because of the difficulty in 
obtaining financing to develop and sell the property.380 Although 
that may be true, the court held that the fiduciaries still had to 
obtain advance approval of the beneficiaries or of a court.381 
Although the court was harsh in its application of the 
standard, the remedy was closer to the result under the corporate 
standard. Because the lots had already been sold to third parties, 
the court agreed that the beneficiaries were entitled to the profits 
received by the fiduciaries as a result of the sale.382 However, the 
court held that because the new corporation had made significant 
improvements to the property before selling it, including building 
houses on the lots, the profit on sale of the property was due to 
the new corporations efforts.383 Therefore, the trust was entitled 
only to the difference between the fair market value of the land 
and the price paid by the new corporation.384 The case was 
remanded because the trial court placed the burden of proving 
                                            
 376. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 56265; see supra notes 2931 and accompanying text 
(noting that due to the lack of supervision and monitoring of trustees, fraud might be 
difficult to detect). 
 377. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 564 (quoting Downs v. Rickards, 4 Del. Ch. 416, 430 
(Del. Ch. 1872)). 
 378. See Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 565 (noting that the principles behind trust law 
serve more than just fairnessthe minimal requirement of the relaxed standard). 
 379. Id. at 56263. The trial court had made a finding that the price paid for the land 
was fair, and thus would have protected them under the corporate standard set forth in 
the Delaware statute. Id. at 56162; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011). However, the 
burden of proving the adequacy of the purchase price was put on the beneficiaries by the 
trial court, whereas the burden under the state statute would be on the interested 
director. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 566, 568; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011); see Keenan 
v. Eshleman, 234 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. 1938) (finding that the interested party has the 
burden of proving fairness where an interested transaction occurs involving multiple 
corporate duties). 
 380. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 565. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. at 56566. This is consistent with the general rule. See 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER 
& ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2, at 107779 (noting that breach results in voiding the 
transaction, or awards costs and profits to the plaintiff). 
 383. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 56566. 
 384. Id. at 566. 
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the inadequacy of the purchase price on the beneficiaries after it 
found no self-dealing, and the beneficiaries were therefore left with 
a duty of care allegation (i.e, charging that the price paid to the 
trust was insufficient).385 Since the supreme court found there was 
self-dealing, the fiduciaries had to prove no damage by proving the 
fairness of the price.386 Therefore, the fiduciaries were able to defend 
the transaction on remand on the basis of fairness of purchase 
price,387 which normally is a defense only in the corporate context.388 
Thus, even though the court held the fiduciaries liable under the 
legal rules, its application of the appropriate remedy switched to the 
more lenient corporate standard. The court should have analyzed it 
as a misappropriation of a trust opportunity and required the 
fiduciaries to disgorge all profits, less any out of pocket expenses.389 
The cases generally illustrate the courts confusion as to 
which standard to apply, and their apparent resolution of the 
issue by first determining the extent of the harm complained of. 
The opinions do give some precedent for considering the design of 
the plan, and the choice of putting one person in the two roles, as 
an indication of the trustors intent to waive certain fiduciary 
duties. However, a dual-role fiduciary reading these decisions 
would receive little if any guidance as to the extent of the 
fiduciary duties applicable to his or her situation. 
IV. A NEW STANDARD FOR THE DUAL-ROLE FIDUCIARY 
While Bruce Winston may have had good grounds to object to 
his brothers administration of his trust and the company, the 
harder question is the one faced by the person who finds himself in 
                                            
 385. Id. at 56667.  
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. The defendants successfully carried the burden of proving a fair purchase 
price on remand and were therefore not liable to the beneficiaries. Stegemeier v. Magness, 
No. Civ. A. 12845, 1999 WL 1083874, at *7, (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 1999), affd 748 A.2d 408 
(Del. 2000). 
 388. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2011) (finding interested transactions not 
automatically voidable where they are fair at the time the transaction takes place); 3 
SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2.1.1, at 108991 (In both England and 
the United States a trustee ordinarily violates the duty of loyalty by purchasing trust 
property in his or her individual capacity without the beneficiaries consent, even if the 
transaction is in all other respects unobjectionable. . . . Of course, if the trustee has 
already paid a fair price, the beneficiaries may affirm the sale, as they may well wish to 
do if the value of the property has fallen, for the sale is not void but voidable. In other 
words, when a trustee purchases trust property without the beneficiaries consent, the 
trustee cannot profit from an increase in the value of the property but must bear the loss 
on a decline.). 
 389. See 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2, at 107879 (reasoning 
that trustees who place their own interests over those of the trust are generally liable for 
loss and for any profits). 
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this dual role, or the question faced by the trustor and business 
owner trying to devise a workable plan. Should the trustee
business manager conduct the business in a manner that takes the 
trust beneficiarys specific financial needs into account? For 
example, if the beneficiary is elderly and the trust is the 
beneficiarys primary source of income, that would seem to dictate 
that the trusteebusiness manager avoid risks, such as expansion 
or development of new product lines that put a current strain on the 
businesss finances and are not likely to pay off in the beneficiarys 
lifetime. Such an approach would certainly affect the long-term 
success of the business, however. This conflict is similar to the 
trustees conflict between serving an income beneficiary and a 
remainder beneficiary, and trust law has responded by imposing a 
duty of impartiality.390 
The duty of impartiality requires that a trustee straddle the 
interests of the two, and not favor one over the other.391 Applied to 
this scenario, the trusteebusiness manager would have to consider 
both the interests of the business and the interests of the 
beneficiary. Extension of the duty of impartiality to this scenario, 
where the trustee is allowed to include the interests of the business 
as an interest to be accommodated, would be a useful solution to the 
trusteebusiness managers dilemma. Application of this principle 
would depend on the circumstances, as does the duty of 
impartiality. For example, the beneficiary may not be very 
dependent on the trust income, and may be young and therefore 
interested in long-term business growth. That fact pattern would 
put the emphasis on the businesss interests over the beneficiarys. 
Also, the extent of the beneficiarys interest compared to other 
owners in the enterprise should also be considered. Other owners 
are in essence third-party beneficiaries of the health of the business 
enterprise. If the impartiality model is extended in this manner, it 
could also be adjusted by the terms of the trust agreement, as 
trustors can adjust the duty of impartiality among beneficiaries.392 
The impartiality approach is rather modest, however, and may not 
                                            
 390. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232 (1959) (explaining that a 
trustee who has a duty to an income beneficiary and some other successive beneficiary 
must both work to create income from the property and avoid unproductive investments, 
while also avoiding investments that will cause the property to depreciate in value); UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 803, 7C U.L.A. 362 (2006) (noting the rule of impartiality). 
 391. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 232 cmt. b (describing the dual duties 
of a fiduciary who has to manage a trust to benefit both an income beneficiary and a 
remainder beneficiary). 
 392. For example, a trustor may specify in the trust instrument that the trustee is to 
consider the lifetime support of the income beneficiary as paramount, even if serving that 
interest jeopardizes the remaindermens interest. 
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be sufficient to give the trusteebusiness manager enough flexibility 
to run the business successfully. Additional adjustment to the dual 
fiduciarys duty is necessary. 
The duty of care owed may be the easiest issue to tackle. The 
risk-taking necessary to run a business and the ability to be free 
from a requirement of diversifying risk both face constraints from 
the trustees duty of care.393 A trustor has significant power to 
reduce the trustees duty of care, as long as the trustee still acts 
with good faith.394 This power of the trustor, together with the 
implication that the trustor intended to reduce the duty of care by 
the creation of the dual role, should be enough to create a 
presumption that the dual-role fiduciarys duty of care should be the 
lesser corporate duty. That presumption could be rebutted by 
statements of contrary intent by the trustor. This approach would 
directly recognize implied waivers of trustee duties by the trustors 
selection of fiduciaries. While some courts have gone this far,395 
courts often require an express waiver of duties by the trustor.396 
This is a criticism raised by Professor Langbein in his argument 
that the contractarian view of trusts should be recognized.397 In 
addressing the imbedded conflicts with respect to the duty of 
loyalty, he gives as an example: 
Low-grade conflicts of interest are especially endemic in 
family trusteeships. We see constantly in real-world practice 
some version of the case in which my father names me trustee 
for my mother for life, remainder to a group including me, 
with a power in the trustee to invade the corpus of the trust 
for the benefit of my mother in the event the life interest 
becomes inadequate for her comfort and support. My father 
has insisted on choosing a conflict-tainted trustee, making the 
judgment that I am to be trusted not to pauperize my 
mother to enrich myself. These situations are especially 
dangerous when the trust is given a controlling interest 
in a close corporation, and I am an officer of that firm. If 
                                            
 393. See supra notes 4765 and accompanying text (describing a trustees duty to 
minimize risks). 
 394. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 cmt. d (2007); 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER  
& ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 25, § 17.6, at 120910. 
 395. See, e.g., Estate of McCredy, 470 A.2d 585, 59495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) 
(interpreting a trust instrument as allowing a trustee to use his own special investment 
philosophy). 
 396. See Estate of Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 93235 (Sur. Ct. 1975); Richard V. 
Wellman, Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal FiduciariesIs Rothko Right?, 77 MICH. 
L. REV. 95, 11314 (1978) (arguing that by selecting trustees whom he knew would have 
conflicts of interest, Mark Rothko intentionally authorized those trustees to serve their 
own personal interests as well as the estates). 
 397. Langbein, supra note 24, at 667. 
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he is well counseled, my father spells out broad authority 
for me as trustee, expressly trumping the default 
standards of the duty of loyalty. But when he neglects 
that step, contractarian analysis encourages us to look at 
the real nature of the trust deal, that is, what he and I 
understood, or what we would have understood about the 
purposes of the trust and the standard for my 
trusteeship. The standard is not the same as when my 
father places a portfolio of fungible financial assets in 
trust with Wells Fargo or Northern Trust.398 
Using the presumption of implied waiver to go as low as the 
applicable business entity standard, complete with the business 
judgment rule, may not give sufficient consideration to the 
beneficiarys inability to exit the arrangement or any particular 
vulnerabilities of the beneficiary. Recognition of the beneficiarys 
situation may factor into the type of facts that could rebut the 
presumption of waiver, but some accommodation of the 
beneficiarys interest may also require an upward adjustment of 
the duty of care, depending on the business entity form and the 
applicable duty. 
The duty of loyalty for the dual-role fiduciary is more 
troublesome. The Stegemeier case illustrated a direct conflict 
between the two roles where the fiduciary looks to transact 
business with the entity. The waiver of such a conflict implied by 
the trustors choice of fiduciary should lessen the burden, but 
dropping the fiduciarys duty down to the business entity 
standard disregards the beneficiarys status in a more sensitive 
context and without the countervailing considerations of the need 
for freedom to take risks in running the enterprise. The strict 
trustee duty, on the other hand, is too limiting in the context 
where the trustee is likely to have his or her own investment in 
the enterprise. Here, the duty of loyalty should be somewhere 
between the two. Professor Langbein proposed a new formulation 
of the trustees duty of loyalty, that of acting in the beneficiarys 
best interest, rather than sole interest.399 Under Professor 
Langbeins formulation, the fiduciary may serve his or her own 
interests, as long as those do not conflict with the beneficiaries.400 
His mechanism for doing so would be to convert the irrebuttable 
presumption of wrongdoing for self-dealing into a rebuttable one, 
allowing the trustee to defend an action of self-dealing on the 
                                            
 398. Id. 
 399. Langbein, supra note 175, at 98082. 
 400. Id. 
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grounds that the beneficiaries interests were not harmed.401 His 
arguments for this dramatic adjustment in the centuries-old rule 
includes numerous examples where the trustee actions 
prohibited under the sole interest rule would in fact be beneficial 
to the beneficiaries.402 The dual fiduciary is a prominent example 
of potential harm to the beneficiaries because of the limitations 
on the trustee intended to protect the beneficiary. This approach 
has already appeared in the Uniform Trust Code, in 
circumstances where the transaction is between the trust and an 
affiliate of the trustee such as a spouse or controlled 
corporation.403 The best interest rule should be extended to 
circumstances where the fiduciary would be able to enter into the 
transaction under the rules of one role, that of business fiduciary, 
but not another, that of trustee. 
In summary, a new hybrid set of rules should be developed 
to guide the dual fiduciary and to evaluate such a fiduciarys 
actions. First, it should be explicitly recognized that the position 
of fiduciary to the business entity requires that the fiduciary 
balance the best interests of the entity with the best interests of 
the trust beneficiaries. In the Winston scenario, Ronald would be 
able to make decisions based on the well-being of the business as 
long as those decisions were not overly harmful to the interests of 
Bruce, the trust beneficiary. On the other hand, he would not be 
required to serve Bruces best interests if those were detrimental 
to the business. This balancing was recognized in the Rosencrans 
decision, which specifically recognized the interests of the 
corporation and the other shareholders as necessary factors in 
the dual fiduciarys decisionmaking.404 The inclusion of the 
interests of the business entity and its other owners as part of 
the decisionmaking considerations does not adequately address 
the specific dilemmas of the dual fiduciary, however. In addition, 
it is necessary to acknowledge that the appointment of a dual 
fiduciary is in fact an implied waiver of strict duties of care and 
loyalty. With respect to duty of care, this implied waiver should 
allow for application of a modified business judgment rule, that 
requires consideration of the beneficiarys more captive position 
than that of other business owners. For duty of loyalty, Professor 
Langbeins proposal that the fiduciary can rebut allegations of 
breach of duty of loyalty with evidence that the beneficiaries 
interests were not harmed should be introduced in the context of 
                                            
 401. Id. at 98081. 
 402. Id. at 95457. 
 403. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 58889 (2006). 
 404. Rosencrans v. Fry, 91 A.2d 162, 16566 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952). 
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dual fiduciaries.405 This approach would allow the fiduciary to 
benefit personally as one of the business owners as well as to 
consider the business entitys well-being and the interests of the 
other business owners. The formalization of this hybrid standard 
for dual fiduciaries would assist courts that heretofore have 
either drifted to one or the other set of standards depending on 
the culpability of the fiduciary or created ad hoc considerations to 
lessen the more strict duties of trustee while still trying to 
maintain special protections for beneficiaries. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The lot of a fiduciary is difficult enough because of the 
uncertainties of the extent of her duties and her exposure to 
liability to the beneficiaries. When the fiduciary serves in two 
different kinds of fiduciary roles with respect to the same 
property, knowing how to stay out of trouble becomes impossible. 
This is particularly true when the two roles are trustee and 
business entity fiduciary, at the two ends of the fiduciary duty 
spectrum. Courts have judged such fiduciaries with a variety of 
standards, based in part on the circumstances and sometimes on 
an assumption that using the stricter duty is the most reasonable 
choice.406 In the absence of clear direction from the trustor who 
put the fiduciary in such an ambiguous situation, courts should 
acknowledge the need for risktaking in business management 
and use the lower standard for duty of care. Courts should adjust 
the duty of loyalty and accommodate the imbedded conflicts with 
the fiduciarys personal interests by using a standard of best 
interests of the beneficiary, rather than sole interest, as the 
limits of the duty of loyalty in this circumstance. The duty of 
impartiality owed by trustees should further be adjusted to allow 
consideration of the needs of the business in addition to the 
diverse needs of the beneficiaries. Although certainty is never 
possible for the fiduciary, codification of these standards for the 
dual-role fiduciary, similar to the codification of trustee duties 
now existing under the Uniform Trust Code, would give the dual-
role fiduciary the most peace of mind when carrying out his 
duties. 
 
                                            
 405. See Langbein, supra note 175, at 98081. 
 406. See supra Part III.B. (describing cases with multiple fiduciaries). 
